The Formation of the “United Front” Policy of the Comintern and Soviet Foreign Policy of 1921–1922

A. Shubin
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Abstract

The author examines the policies of the Comintern in the context of the Soviet foreign policy in 1921–1922. He demonstrates that the dynamics of the former was not directly tied to the course of the latter and the turn to the NEP in March 1921. The Comintern had its own internal logic of development. With its help the communist leadership could manoeuvre between a more radical probing of the readiness of the capitalist world for a new wave of revolutionary destabilisation or a moderate policy of prolonged “siege” of capitalism, which involved rapprochement with social democracy under the banner of a “united workers' front”. By early 1922, following sharp discussions on the eve and during the Third Congress of the Comintern, its policies were gradually synchronised with the foreign policy course of Soviet Russia, which allowed rapprochement with West European Social Democracy to be exploited in Soviet foreign interests. However, there was little diplomatic gain from this, and after the failure of the Genoa Conference the Comintern continued to pursue a “united front” policy, no longer directly linked to the objectives of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, but as the basis of the Communist strategy for the struggle to ascend to power in Western Europe. At the same time, both in negotiations with the Social Democrats and in planning at the Fourth Congress of the Comintern, the Communists prioritised their monopoly on power, regarding the policy of alliances and concessions as tactical and temporary, rejecting the “political NEP” and the pluralist model of multiparty democratic socialism.
共产国际“统一战线”政策的形成与苏联1921-1922年的外交政策
作者在1921-1922年苏联外交政策的背景下考察了共产国际的政策。他证明了前者的动力与后者的进程以及1921年3月转向新经济政策没有直接联系。共产国际有其自身的内在发展逻辑。在它的帮助下,共产党领导层可以在更激进地探索资本主义世界是否准备好迎接新一波革命动荡,或采取长期“围困”资本主义的温和政策之间进行调整,这包括在“工人联合阵线”的旗帜下与社会民主党和解。到1922年初,在共产国际第三次代表大会前夕和期间的激烈讨论之后,其政策逐渐与苏俄的外交政策进程同步,这使得与西欧社会民主党的和解得以利用,以实现苏联的对外利益。然而,这几乎没有外交上的收获,在热那亚会议失败后,共产国际继续奉行“统一战线”政策,不再直接与外交事务人民委员部的目标联系在一起,而是作为共产党在西欧夺取政权的斗争战略的基础。与此同时,无论是在与社会民主党的谈判中,还是在共产国际第四次代表大会的规划中,共产党人都优先考虑他们对权力的垄断,将联盟和让步的政策视为策略和暂时的,拒绝“政治新经济政策”和多党民主社会主义的多元模式。
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