Ersatz Belief and Real Belief

Q3 Arts and Humanities

Symposion Pub Date : 2019-06-05 DOI:10.5840/symposion2019613

J. Gellman

引用次数: 0

Abstract

Philosophers have given much attention to belief and knowledge. Here I introduce an epistemic category close to but different from belief, that I call ‘ersatz’ belief. Recognition of this category refines our catalogue of epistemic attitudes in an important way.

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伪信仰和真信仰

哲学家们对信仰和知识给予了很大的关注。在这里，我介绍一个与信仰相近但又不同的认知范畴，我称之为“伪信仰”。对这一范畴的认识在一个重要的方面改进了我们的认识态度的目录。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Symposion Arts and Humanities-Philosophy

CiteScore

0.40

自引率

0.00%

发文量

审稿时长

6 weeks

期刊介绍： Symposion was published for the first time in 2003, as Symposion – Revistă de științe socio-umane (Symposion – A Journal of Humanities), with the purpose of providing a supportive space for academic communication, dialogue, and debate, both intra and interdisciplinary, for philosophical humanities and social and political sciences. Symposion: Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences shares essentially the same purpose. Its main aim is to promote and provide open access to peer-reviewed, high quality contributions (articles, discussion notes, review essays or book reviews) in philosophy, other humanities, and social and political sciences connected with philosophy.