A Resilient Auction Framework for Deadline-Aware Jobs in Cloud Spot Market

2017 IEEE 36th Symposium on Reliable Distributed Systems (SRDS) Pub Date : 2017-09-01 DOI:10.1109/SRDS.2017.34

A. S. Sabyasachi, H. M. D. Kabir, A. Abdelmoniem, S. Mondal

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引用次数: 14

Abstract

Public cloud providers, such as Amazon EC2, offer idle computing resources known as spot instances at a much cheaper rate compared to On-Demand instances. Spot instance prices are set dynamically according to market demand. Cloud users request spot instances by submitting their bid, and if user's bid price exceeds current spot price then a spot instance is assigned to that user. The problem however is that while spot instances are executing their jobs, they can be revoked whenever the spot price rises above the current bid of the user. In such scenarios and to complete jobs reliably, we propose a set of improvements for the cloud spot market which benefits both the provider and users. Typically, the new framework allows users to bid different prices depending on their perceived urgency and nature of the running job. Hence, it practically allow them to negotiate the current bid price in a way that guarantees the timely completion of their jobs. To complement our intuition, we have conducted an empirical study using real cloud spot price traces to evaluate our framework strategies which aim to achieve a resilient deadline-aware auction framework.

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云现货市场中截止日期敏感工作的弹性拍卖框架

公共云提供商，如Amazon EC2，以比按需实例便宜得多的价格提供空闲的计算资源，即spot实例。现货价格是根据市场需求动态设定的。云用户通过提交投标请求现货实例，如果用户的投标价格超过当前现货价格，则将一个现货实例分配给该用户。然而，问题是，当现货实例正在执行它们的作业时，只要现货价格高于用户的当前出价，它们就会被撤销。在这种情况下，为了可靠地完成工作，我们提出了一组对云现货市场的改进，这对提供商和用户都有利。通常，新框架允许用户根据他们感知到的紧迫性和运行任务的性质来出价不同的价格。因此，它实际上允许他们以保证及时完成工作的方式谈判当前的投标价格。为了补充我们的直觉，我们使用真实的云现货价格轨迹进行了一项实证研究，以评估我们的框架策略，旨在实现有弹性的截止日期感知拍卖框架。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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2017 IEEE 36th Symposium on Reliable Distributed Systems (SRDS)

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