How the Health Care Revolution Fell Short

Q2 Social Sciences
C. Havighurst
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引用次数: 10

Abstract

Beginning in the 1970s, some reformers envisioned something like a true revolution in American health care, one that would install "a truly democratic regime based on competition and real consumer choice." This article explains why that revolution never achieved its most ambitious goals. After noting some ground gained by consumers as a result of antitrust enforcement and other reforms leading to the managed-care movement, it considers the complex reasons why modern health plans ultimately failed (1) to effectively integrate the provision of health care with its financing, enabling them to manage trade-offs in the interest of their subscribers; (2) to offer consumers a full range of health care options, including not only expensive, ostensibly high-quality care and coverage but also appreciably cheaper versions of possibly lesser quality; and (3) to earn consumers' trust as their post-revolutionary representatives and allies in the battle against high health care costs and entrenched professional power. The article then turns to an appraisal of the political economy of American health care law and policy to show why the health care revolution never had a realistic chance to empower ordinary consumers. Whereas most analysts believe that health care markets are doomed to fail because consumers are ignorant concerning the quality of care, the article argues that a much greater problem is consumers' ignorance concerning the cost of their health coverage – an ignorance that is not inevitable but is instead fostered by the way government subsidizes health care (either through direct public financing or indirectly through the tax system). The result of this contrived ignorance, at least in the private sector, is a special kind of moral hazard – not the unavoidable kind inherent in third-party health insurance but the "one that operates when employers, government, and the legal system write prescriptions [with hidden costs] which consumers must pay." The article includes an innovative model of majoritarian and interest-group politics that explains not only "over-regulation" – that is, cost-increasing legal requirements that benefit the majority at the expense of the (lower-income) minority – but also "hyper-regulation," which (once hidden costs are counted) diminishes the welfare of the great majority of voters while benefitting only the health care industry and its upper-income patrons. The article then identifies some additional respects in which the American health care system, especially since the successful counter-revolution against managed care, appears to be scandalously regressive. Among other likely sources of systematic regressivity – besides regulatory standards biased against low-income consumers – are the following: employers' tendency to design benefits to serve the interests and preferences of their higher-income employees; providers' tendency to tailor clinical choices according to patient expectations, which may vary according to income; discrepancies in the ability of higher- and lower-income patients to "work the system," especially now that consumers possess extensive appeal rights (e.g., Rush-Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran); the probable disparate impact of cost sharing on high- and low-income individuals' consumption of insured services; and the way the tort system distributes its costs (equally) and benefits (unequally, at least insofar as it compensates for lost income). To be sure, empirical evidence is lacking concerning how much more or less care certain income groups consume than they pay for. But the article observes many respects in which the American health care system appears to serve elite interests at the expense of the majority of ignorant consumers/employees/voters, who are not only denied by law the chance to opt for cheap health coverage (with public subsidies ensuring basic adequacy) but often forced to forgo health coverage altogether. The article concludes by speculating about the (mostly discouraging) prospects for restarting the health care revolution, so that the American health care system can finally serve all Americans well.
医疗改革是如何失败的
从20世纪70年代开始,一些改革者设想了一场类似于美国医疗保健的真正革命,一场将建立“一个基于竞争和真正的消费者选择的真正民主制度”的革命。这篇文章解释了为什么这场革命从未实现其最雄心勃勃的目标。在注意到消费者因反垄断执法和其他导致管理式医疗运动的改革而取得的一些进展之后,它考虑了现代健康计划最终失败的复杂原因(1)未能有效地将医疗保健的提供与其融资结合起来,使他们能够为订户的利益管理权衡;(2)为消费者提供全方位的医疗保健选择,不仅包括昂贵的、表面上高质量的医疗服务和覆盖范围,还包括质量可能较低的、价格明显较低的医疗服务;(3)赢得消费者的信任,作为他们革命后的代表和盟友,与高昂的医疗成本和根深蒂固的专业权力作斗争。然后,文章转向对美国医疗保健法律和政策的政治经济学的评估,以说明为什么医疗保健革命从来没有一个现实的机会赋予普通消费者权力。尽管大多数分析人士认为,医疗保健市场注定要失败,因为消费者对医疗质量一无所知,但这篇文章认为,更大的问题是消费者对医疗保险成本的无知——这种无知并非不可避免,而是由政府补贴医疗保健的方式(通过直接公共融资或间接通过税收系统)助长的。这种人为无知的结果,至少在私营部门,是一种特殊的道德风险——不是第三方医疗保险固有的那种不可避免的道德风险,而是“当雇主、政府和法律体系开出处方(带有隐性成本),消费者必须支付的那种道德风险”。这篇文章包含了一个多数主义和利益集团政治的创新模型,它不仅解释了“过度监管”——即以牺牲(低收入)少数人为代价而使大多数人受益的成本增加的法律要求——而且解释了“过度监管”(一旦计算隐性成本),它减少了绝大多数选民的福利,而只使医疗保健行业及其高收入赞助人受益。这篇文章接着指出了美国医疗保健系统的一些其他方面,特别是自从对管理式医疗的成功反革命以来,似乎是可耻的倒退。除了对低收入消费者有偏见的监管标准之外,系统回归的其他可能来源包括:雇主倾向于设计福利,以服务于高收入员工的利益和偏好;提供者倾向于根据患者的期望来调整临床选择,而患者的期望可能因收入而异;高收入和低收入患者在“系统运作”方面的能力差异,特别是现在消费者拥有广泛的上诉权(例如,Rush-Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran);成本分担对高、低收入个人保险服务消费可能产生的差异影响;以及侵权制度分配成本(平均)和收益(不平均,至少在补偿收入损失方面)的方式。可以肯定的是,缺乏经验证据表明,某些收入群体的医疗支出比他们的支出多多少或少多少。但这篇文章观察到,在许多方面,美国的医疗体系似乎以牺牲大多数无知的消费者/雇员/选民的利益为代价,为精英们的利益服务,他们不仅被法律剥夺了选择廉价医疗保险的机会(公共补贴确保了基本的充足性),而且经常被迫完全放弃医疗保险。文章最后推测了重启医疗改革的前景(大部分令人沮丧),这样美国的医疗体系才能最终为所有美国人提供良好的服务。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
Law and Contemporary Problems
Law and Contemporary Problems Social Sciences-Law
CiteScore
2.00
自引率
0.00%
发文量
1
期刊介绍: Law and Contemporary Problems was founded in 1933 and is the oldest journal published at Duke Law School. It is a quarterly, interdisciplinary, faculty-edited publication of Duke Law School. L&CP recognizes that many fields in the sciences, social sciences, and humanities can enhance the development and understanding of law. It is our purpose to seek out these areas of overlap and to publish balanced symposia that enlighten not just legal readers, but readers from these other disciplines as well. L&CP uses a symposium format, generally publishing one symposium per issue on a topic of contemporary concern. Authors and articles are selected to ensure that each issue collectively creates a unified presentation of the contemporary problem under consideration. L&CP hosts an annual conference at Duke Law School featuring the authors of one of the year’s four symposia.
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