Multi-business Firms' Corporate Renewal Decisions: Divestiture Governance Mode Choice of Corporate Spin-Offs and Equity Carve-Outs

Sandra Corredor, Joseph T. Mahoney
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引用次数: 2

Abstract

The primary functions of corporate headquarters in multi-business firms are for entrepreneurial value creation and administrative loss prevention. A prominent way in which firms can renew their resources and capabilities is through divestitures. While the positive effects of divestitures on parent companies are well documented, we know relatively less about the comparative assessment of different divestiture governance modes. To address this research gap, we focus on a comparative assessment of two divestiture governance modes – corporate spin-offs and equity carve-outs – and examine under what conditions each divestiture governance mode is more likely to benefit the parent company. Five divestiture corporate goals are identified: address business unit under-performance; recover from corporate parent funding deficit; reduce liability risk; parent company’s managerial refocus; and respond to third parties’ interactions. We also explore two boundary conditions that influence the corporate parent’s divestiture governance mode choice, namely potential economic holdup problems between the parent company and the divested business unit; and uncertainty in divested business unit performance. We organize these managerial goals and boundary conditions within four transaction cost economics and real options themes, i.e., adaptability, contract law, incentive intensity, and intertemporal spillovers to explain and predict corporate parents’ divestiture governance mode choice, and suggest research opportunities to further join transaction cost economics and real options theory for explaining corporate strategy more generally, and the parent company’s divestiture governance mode choice of corporate spin-offs and equity carve-outs, in particular.
多业务公司的公司更新决策:公司分拆与股权分拆的剥离治理模式选择
在多业务公司中,公司总部的主要职能是创造企业价值和防止行政损失。企业更新资源和能力的一个重要方式是剥离资产。虽然剥离对母公司的积极影响已被充分证明,但我们对不同剥离治理模式的比较评估了解相对较少。为了弥补这一研究空白,我们重点对两种剥离治理模式——公司分拆和股权剥离——进行了比较评估,并考察了在什么条件下每种剥离治理模式更有可能使母公司受益。确定了五个剥离企业目标:解决业务部门表现不佳的问题;从母公司资金赤字中恢复;降低责任风险;母公司管理重心的调整;并回应第三方的互动。我们还探讨了影响母公司剥离治理模式选择的两个边界条件,即母公司与剥离业务单位之间潜在的经济阻塞问题;剥离业务单位业绩的不确定性。我们将这些管理目标和边界条件组织在适应性、合同法、激励强度和跨期溢出这四个交易成本经济学和实物期权主题中,以解释和预测母公司的剥离治理模式选择,并提出进一步将交易成本经济学和实物期权理论结合起来更普遍地解释公司战略的研究机会。而母公司的资产剥离治理模式选择,尤其是公司分拆和股权分拆。
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