Financial Reporting Quality, Investment Horizon, and Institutional Investor Trading Strategies

Brian J. Bushee, Theodore H. Goodman, S. Sunder
{"title":"Financial Reporting Quality, Investment Horizon, and Institutional Investor Trading Strategies","authors":"Brian J. Bushee, Theodore H. Goodman, S. Sunder","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3207369","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"\n This paper provides evidence that financial reporting quality (FRQ) influences the holding costs of trading strategies. While prior research has focused on the benefits of investment strategies based on poor FRQ (i.e., larger returns due to a greater amount of private information), we examine whether poor FRQ imposes greater holding costs on certain trading strategies. We show that poor FRQ motivates sophisticated investors with short-term horizons to tilt their portfolios away from value stocks, whose returns are contingent on investors revising their beliefs about firm fundamental value, and toward past winner stocks, whose future returns are realized more quickly. Poor FRQ also increases the length of time that institutions maintain large positions in value stocks. Our results imply that mis-valuations can be persistent when arbitrageurs perceive high holding costs from poor financial quality, even when they can see through the opaque financial disclosures.","PeriodicalId":80976,"journal":{"name":"Comparative labor law journal : a publication of the U.S. National Branch of the International Society for Labor Law and Social Security [and] the Wharton School, and the Law School of the University of Pennsylvania","volume":"42 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2018-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"14","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Comparative labor law journal : a publication of the U.S. National Branch of the International Society for Labor Law and Social Security [and] the Wharton School, and the Law School of the University of Pennsylvania","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3207369","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 14

Abstract

This paper provides evidence that financial reporting quality (FRQ) influences the holding costs of trading strategies. While prior research has focused on the benefits of investment strategies based on poor FRQ (i.e., larger returns due to a greater amount of private information), we examine whether poor FRQ imposes greater holding costs on certain trading strategies. We show that poor FRQ motivates sophisticated investors with short-term horizons to tilt their portfolios away from value stocks, whose returns are contingent on investors revising their beliefs about firm fundamental value, and toward past winner stocks, whose future returns are realized more quickly. Poor FRQ also increases the length of time that institutions maintain large positions in value stocks. Our results imply that mis-valuations can be persistent when arbitrageurs perceive high holding costs from poor financial quality, even when they can see through the opaque financial disclosures.
财务报告质量、投资视野和机构投资者交易策略
本文提供了财务报告质量(FRQ)影响交易策略持有成本的证据。虽然之前的研究集中在基于低FRQ的投资策略的好处上(即,由于更多的私人信息而获得更大的回报),但我们研究了低FRQ是否会给某些交易策略带来更高的持有成本。我们的研究表明,糟糕的FRQ会促使短线眼光的老练投资者将投资组合从价值型股票中倾斜出来,价值型股票的回报取决于投资者对坚定基本价值的信念的修正,而过去的赢家股票,其未来回报实现得更快。糟糕的FRQ也增加了机构在价值型股票中持有大量头寸的时间长度。我们的研究结果表明,当套利者从糟糕的财务质量中感知到高持有成本时,即使他们能够看穿不透明的财务披露,错误估值也可能持续存在。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 求助全文
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信