Cinderella's Slipper: A Better Approach to Regulating Cryptoassets as Securities

Carol R. Goforth
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引用次数: 1

Abstract

The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) seeks both to protect investors and to promote efficient capital formation, but in the context of cryptoassets these goals sometimes collide. The SEC vigorously reacts to fraudulent offerings of cryptoassets but has had to do so by forcing crypto into an antiquated framework designed with very different interests in mind. Even worse than the convoluted and complex arguments needed to force crypto into the existing category of “investment contracts,” once crypto is treated as a security, a host of onerous and inapt disclosure requirements and regulations follow. Developers, promoters, exchanges, and others who might assist in the sale of such assets are all forced into a regime that was never intended to cover this new class of assets.

This Article therefore suggests changes to the existing regulatory regime to more fairly apportion duties and responsibilities between regulators, issuers, promoters, and purchasers. This Article suggests that the SEC is the appropriate agency to oversee transactions in cryptoassets, but the underlying legislation should be amended to create a new category of securities, with different disclosure requirements and exemptions tailored to the informational needs of potential crypto purchasers. Maintaining the current anti-fraud rules will protect the public while allowing for innovation in this rapidly moving space. It will avoid wasting assets of both regulators and the regulated by eliminating the debate over whether crypto is or is not a security and will avoid duplication of efforts between the SEC and other federal regulators. It will also improve the relevance of available information for potential purchasers. This approach has the dual advantage of facilitating both parts of the SEC’s mission: protection of investors while supporting innovative capital formation for legitimate crypto enterprises.
灰姑娘的拖鞋:将加密资产作为证券进行监管的更好方法
美国证券交易委员会(SEC)既寻求保护投资者,又寻求促进有效的资本形成,但在加密资产的背景下,这些目标有时会发生冲突。美国证券交易委员会(SEC)对加密资产的欺诈性发行做出了积极反应,但不得不强迫加密进入一个考虑到不同利益而设计的过时框架。比迫使加密货币进入现有的“投资合同”类别所需的复杂而复杂的论据更糟糕的是,一旦加密货币被视为一种证券,就会出现大量繁重而不恰当的披露要求和法规。开发商、发起人、交易所和其他可能协助出售此类资产的人都被迫进入一个从未打算涵盖这种新资产类别的制度。因此,本文建议改变现有的监管制度,以更公平地分配监管机构、发行人、发起人和购买者之间的职责和责任。本文表明,美国证券交易委员会是监督加密资产交易的适当机构,但应修改基础立法,以创建一种新的证券类别,并根据潜在加密购买者的信息需求制定不同的披露要求和豁免。维持目前的反欺诈规则将保护公众,同时允许在这个快速变化的领域进行创新。通过消除关于加密货币是否是证券的争论,它将避免浪费监管机构和被监管机构的资产,并将避免SEC和其他联邦监管机构之间的重复工作。它还将提高现有信息对潜在购买者的相关性。这种方法具有双重优势,可以促进SEC使命的两个部分:保护投资者,同时支持合法加密企业的创新资本形成。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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