Idiosyncratic Constitutional Review in Cyprus: (Re-)Design, Survival and Kelsen

Abstract

Abstract The model of the Austrian Constitutional Court, with its Kelsenian origins, has been influential in the Cypriot constitutional context in a variety of intertwined and changing ways. The initial constitutional design followed the centralized and concentrated constitutional review by the Supreme Constitutional Court. The collapse of the bi-communal structure of the Cypriot system resulted in the application of the law of necessity and the establishment of a new Supreme Court with a simultaneous decentralization of constitutional review. At the time of writing a new reform initiative is underway, and the discussion about the Austrian model and Kelsen is revived. The continuous and varied influence from the Austrian prototype and interestingly the Kelsenian logic is assessed while recognizing the delicate idiosyncrasies of the Cypriot setting. The argument is that at neither stage the Austrian model was purely applied in Cyprus and the systemic adjustments were the result of improvisation rather than model adherence. This paper highlights the inconsistencies in the understanding of the Austrian model and explains the ‘modelling vertigo’.