Book Review: Aspinall, E. & Sukmajati, M. (Eds.). (2016). Electoral Dynamics in Indonesia. Money Politics, Patronage and Clientelism at the Grassroots.

Abstract

Book Review: Aspinall, E. & Sukmajati, M. (Eds.). (2016). Electoral Dynamics in Indonesia. Money Politics, Patronage and Clientelism at the Grassroots. Singapore: NUS Press. ISBN 978-981-4722-04-9. 449 pages.In 2018, Indonesia will celebrate the 20th anniversary of its democratization process that was augmented after the fall of long-term authoritarian president Suharto in May 1998. Since then, Indonesia has witnessed four legislative elections (1999, 2004, 2009, and 2014), which were generally welcomed as largely free and fair. However, the extent to which Indonesian politics in general - and elections specifically - are being dominated by money politics, patronage, and clientelism remains one of the main concerns of many scholars and observers (e.g., Aspinall, 2013; Hadiz & Robison, 2013; Mietzner, 2013; Robertson-Snape, 1999; Simandjuntak, 2012; van Klinken, 2009). In this respect, it appears that the 2014 legislative elections marked a disturbing peak. In the introduction to their edited volume Electoral Dynamics in Indonesia1, Edward Aspinall and Mada Sukmajati describe the role money politics played in the 2014 elections as "the most 'massive' it had ever been" (p. 2).The research presented in Aspinall's and Sukmajati's volume aims at "identifying the chief mechanisms that Indonesian legislative candidates used to appeal to voters [in the 2014 legislative elections]" (p. ix). The volume originates from an impressive collaborative research project comprising 50, mostly Indonesian, researchers who observed the lead up to the 2014 national legislative elections in 20 of Indonesia's 34 provinces.2 All in all, 1,500 interviews with candidates and campaigners were conducted and hundreds of campaign events observed.The book comprises 23 chapters - a comprehensive introduction and 22 case studies that present empirical data from across Indonesia. In their introduction "Patronage and Clientelism in Indonesian Electoral Politics", Aspinall and Sukmajati give a brief overview of relevant works on patronage and clientelism in lndonesian politics, explain the research design and goals, summarize the main findings of the case studies, and last but not least, hint to limitations of the volume while pointing out desiderates for further research.In reviewing the literature on the role of patronage and clientelism in lndonesian politics, the authors cite a wide range of publications that stress the key role of patronage and clientelist practices in Indonesian electoral as well as party politics. At the same time, the authors criticize the limited knowledge that exists regarding the actual workings and functioning of such mechanisms as compared to other Southeast Asia countries (e.g., Thailand). Accordingly, the case studies presented in Chapters 13 to 16, describe in detail how vote buying actually works for the first time.Although the research underpinning the volume did not exclusively focus on patronage politics by legislative candidates, the authors conclude that "patronage distribution is the central mode of political campaigning in Indonesian legislative elections" (p. 5). This is not only supported by the findings of all 22 case studies presented in the volume but also illustrated by statements of candidates quoted in the introduction who, after the elections, publicly regretted their decision to refrain from handing out monetary incentives. But, what is it that actually made patronage feature so prominently in the 2014 elections? Aspinall and Sukmajati go into depth to find answers to this question - which also is the main argument of the volume - by looking into the legal changes in the Indonesian elections legislation over the past 15 years. In its second3 democratic elections in 1999, Indonesia used a fully closed proportional representation system. In this system, the place of a candidate on the party list, and on the ballot paper accordingly, decided whether or not he or she would win a seat in an electoral district. …