Credible commitments in contract relations: Where are the limits of the possible?

IF 0.5 Q4 MANAGEMENT
A. Shastitko
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引用次数: 2

Abstract

Credible commitments are the most important condition for contracts sustainability. The effects and ways of ensuring the commitments credibility are discussed in the new institutional economics and game theory. At the same time, there is a number of unresolved issues related to the microeconomic aspects of obligations’ reliability in contracts regarding specific resources. The article delves into various approaches to determining credible commitments in contractual relations at the micro level in the context of bilateral (multilateral) opportunism. The methodological basis of the study is the transaction costs economics. The paper shows the limitations of the compensation approach in modeling credible liabilities and explains the importance of relational credible commitments for ensuring sustainability and effectiveness of contracts. The author proposes an extended model of hostages in contracts using specific resources as a way of solving the “ugly princess” problem. Based on the specification of the temporal structure of contracting, we develop a game-theoretic model that takes into account the possibilities of opportunism on the part of both the pledger and the pledgee as an investor in specific assets. The study demonstrates the consequences of the wrong hostage chosen, as well as the characteristics of the interaction equilibrium due to the correct choice of it with an indication of the residual opportunism problem. The research provides a rationale why the promisee and the potential purchaser of full rights to an asset acting as a hostage are not always the same actor. The approaches to dealing with credible commitments in the context of renegotiations and multilateral contracts are outlined. The research results can serve as a basis for designing contracts requiring reciprocal collateral.
合同关系中的可信承诺:可能性的极限在哪里?
可信的承诺是合同可持续性的最重要条件。从新制度经济学和博弈论的角度探讨了保证承诺可信度的作用和途径。与此同时,关于具体资源合同中义务可靠性的微观经济方面还有一些尚未解决的问题。本文深入探讨了在双边(多边)机会主义背景下,在微观层面确定合同关系中可信承诺的各种方法。本研究的方法论基础是交易成本经济学。本文显示了补偿方法在建立可信责任模型中的局限性,并解释了关系可信承诺对于确保合同的可持续性和有效性的重要性。作者提出了一种利用特定资源的合同中人质的扩展模型,作为解决“丑陋公主”问题的一种方法。基于契约时间结构的规范,我们建立了一个博弈论模型,该模型考虑了出质人和质权人作为特定资产投资者的机会主义可能性。本研究论证了人质选择错误的后果,以及人质选择正确所导致的相互作用均衡的特征,并指出了残余机会主义问题。该研究提供了一个理由,为什么承诺和潜在购买者的全部权利的资产作为人质并不总是相同的行为者。概述了在重新谈判和多边合同的情况下处理可信承诺的办法。研究结果可作为设计互惠担保契约的依据。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
自引率
40.00%
发文量
47
审稿时长
16 weeks
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