Warding Off Development: Local Control, Housing Supply, and NIMBYs

Evan Mast
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引用次数: 11

Abstract

Local control of land-use regulation creates a not-in-my-backyard (NIMBY) problem that can suppress housing construction, contributing to rising prices and potentially slowing economic growth. I study how increased local control affects housing production by exploiting a common electoral reform—changing from “at-large” to “ward” elections for town council. These reforms, which are not typically motivated by housing markets, shrink each representative's constituency from the entire town to one ward. Results from a variety of difference-in-differences estimators show that this decentralization decreases housing units permitted by 20%, with similar effects on multi- and single-family permits. Effects are larger in whiter and higher-income towns.
抵制发展:地方控制、住房供应和邻避
地方对土地使用监管的控制造成了“邻避”问题,这可能会抑制住房建设,导致房价上涨,并可能减缓经济增长。我通过利用一种常见的选举改革——将镇议会的“一般”选举改为“选区”选举——来研究地方控制权的增加如何影响住房生产。这些改革通常不是由房地产市场推动的,而是将每位议员的选区从整个城镇缩小到一个选区。各种差异估计的结果表明,这种分散化减少了20%的住房许可,对多户和单户许可的影响相似。对白人和高收入城镇的影响更大。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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