{"title":"A better start: board diversity matters in assessing stock price crash risk","authors":"Kyungshick Cho, Jaeyoung Cho, Yiyang Bian","doi":"10.1108/cg-11-2022-0460","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"\nPurpose\nThe determinants that contribute to reducing stock price crash risk have garnered attention from scholars and practitioners. However, our understanding of the relationship between board diversity and stock crash risk, as well as the contextual factors that influence this relationship, remains limited. To address this gap, this study aims to investigate how different attributes of board diversity affect stock price crash risk, particularly under conditions of higher performance hazard and ownership concentration.\n\n\nDesign/methodology/approach\nUsing a two-stage least squares fixed-effects estimator, the authors analyze a panel data set of 1,792 firm-year observations across 282 firms listed on the KOSPI200 from 2010 to 2019.\n\n\nFindings\nRelation-oriented diversity reduces future stock price crash risk, particularly when firms experience performance shortfalls and have concentrated ownership structures, but task-oriented diversity has no significant effects. The results imply that only relation-oriented diversity strengthens governance mechanisms by curtailing managerial bad news withholding behaviors, and the role of relation-oriented diversity in reducing stock crash risk becomes more crucial when firms have higher performance hazard and concentrated ownership.\n\n\nOriginality/value\nThis study makes crucial contributions as follows: the authors contribute to the stock crash risk literature by shifting the focus from how to when board diversity matters in assessing stock crash risk; the authors extend the board diversity research and enhance scholarly understanding of the effects of board diversity on corporate governance by highlighting that not all aspects of board diversity improve firm governance mechanisms; and the authors widen the lens from a single attribute to multiple attributes of diversity to reveal the effects of diversity on boards in assessing future crash risk.\n","PeriodicalId":47880,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance-The International Journal of Business in Society","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":5.5000,"publicationDate":"2023-09-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Corporate Governance-The International Journal of Business in Society","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1108/cg-11-2022-0460","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"BUSINESS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
Purpose
The determinants that contribute to reducing stock price crash risk have garnered attention from scholars and practitioners. However, our understanding of the relationship between board diversity and stock crash risk, as well as the contextual factors that influence this relationship, remains limited. To address this gap, this study aims to investigate how different attributes of board diversity affect stock price crash risk, particularly under conditions of higher performance hazard and ownership concentration.
Design/methodology/approach
Using a two-stage least squares fixed-effects estimator, the authors analyze a panel data set of 1,792 firm-year observations across 282 firms listed on the KOSPI200 from 2010 to 2019.
Findings
Relation-oriented diversity reduces future stock price crash risk, particularly when firms experience performance shortfalls and have concentrated ownership structures, but task-oriented diversity has no significant effects. The results imply that only relation-oriented diversity strengthens governance mechanisms by curtailing managerial bad news withholding behaviors, and the role of relation-oriented diversity in reducing stock crash risk becomes more crucial when firms have higher performance hazard and concentrated ownership.
Originality/value
This study makes crucial contributions as follows: the authors contribute to the stock crash risk literature by shifting the focus from how to when board diversity matters in assessing stock crash risk; the authors extend the board diversity research and enhance scholarly understanding of the effects of board diversity on corporate governance by highlighting that not all aspects of board diversity improve firm governance mechanisms; and the authors widen the lens from a single attribute to multiple attributes of diversity to reveal the effects of diversity on boards in assessing future crash risk.
期刊介绍:
Providing a consistent source of in-depth information, analysis and advice considering corporate governance on an international scale, Corporate Governance: The International Journal of Business in Society focuses on knowledge development, practice and performance standards for scholars and Boards of Directors/ Governors of companies throughout the world. The journal publishes a diverse range of substantive theoretical and methodological debates as well as practical developments in the field of corporate governance worldwide. The journal particularly encourages attention to the impact of changes of business/corporate governance forms and practices on people, and the sustainability of different governance models. Articles that highlight models and structures that advance the interests, dignity and well being of all stakeholders, in a sustainable manner, are particularly welcome. The journal covers a broad spectrum of governance-related themes including: -Effective boardroom performance -Control and regulation -Executive leadership -The role and contribution of external (non-executive) directors -The growing importance of governance in the wake of ever-greater corporate scandals -Redefinitions and reassessments of corporate governance models -The role of business in society -The changing nature of the relationship and responsibilities of the firm towards various stakeholders -The incentives required to encourage more socially- and environmentally-responsible corporate action -The role and impact of local and international regulatory agencies and regimes on corporate behaviour.