{"title":"Four Ways of Going “Right” Functions in Mental Disorder","authors":"A. Plutynski","doi":"10.1353/ppp.2023.a899950","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Abstract:In this paper, I distinguish four ways in which aspects or features of mental illness may be said to be functional. I contend that discussion of teleological perspectives on mental illness has unfortunately tended to conflate these senses. The latter two senses have played important practical roles both in predicting and explaining patterns of behavior, cognition, and affective response, atnd relatedly, in developing successful interventions. I further argue that functional talk in this context is neither inconsistent with viewing some disorders as dysfunctional in one of several senses, nor inappropriately adaptationist, provided we keep these senses of function distinct, and are precise about which is in play in a given context.","PeriodicalId":45397,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy Psychiatry & Psychology","volume":"37 1","pages":"181 - 191"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6000,"publicationDate":"2023-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Philosophy Psychiatry & Psychology","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1353/ppp.2023.a899950","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"PHILOSOPHY","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
Abstract:In this paper, I distinguish four ways in which aspects or features of mental illness may be said to be functional. I contend that discussion of teleological perspectives on mental illness has unfortunately tended to conflate these senses. The latter two senses have played important practical roles both in predicting and explaining patterns of behavior, cognition, and affective response, atnd relatedly, in developing successful interventions. I further argue that functional talk in this context is neither inconsistent with viewing some disorders as dysfunctional in one of several senses, nor inappropriately adaptationist, provided we keep these senses of function distinct, and are precise about which is in play in a given context.