On the Subject of Cognition at Historiography of Philosophy

Abstract

Historiography of philosophy as a philosophical discipline has an ambivalent status. It must seek facts and care about thoughts. The discussion on this subject is continuing. The purpose of this article is to clarify the specific role of the subjectivity in the historiography of philosophy and consider functions and forms of its presence in research texts. Actually, texts are the place in which a researcher carries out him/herself as the researcher. So, he/she obtains the identity in the text or does not at all. It means that the subjectivity as the instance of the cognitive activity does not coincide with the empirical subject and must be reconstructed in the text. It is the first. The second is that in the text the researcher builds bridges between past and present: the past gains access to the present, and vice versa – the present has access to the past. He/ she does not speak with the own voice but must hear another. The third is that the existence of interpreters as a social group rejects the legitimacy of a direct contact between the text and the reader and promises the contact in the text of the researcher. Taking to account these assumptions I show a role of subjectivity in the sort of cognition, which historiography of philosophy is. I give answers to such questions. What do the historians of philosophy say in his/her texts? What is the specificity of philosophical communication with the past? What requirements to the reader do the philosophical texts “put forward”? What is the role of mood and feeling in saving contacts with philosophical thought of the past? The analysis is based on some theoretical ideas of Y. Ch. Zarka (Philosophical History of Philosophy) and F. R. Ankersmit (sublime historical experience). The conclusions are confirmed with a brief comparative analysis of two publications on the philosophy of the eighteenth century. Article received 15.02.2019