Revisiting the Concept of Common Pool Resources :Beyond Ostrom

Abstract

IntroductionEnvironmental problems are often compared to "the tragedy of the commons" (Hardin 1968). This perspective has been expanded in the 50 years since Hardin cited shared pastures as an example of the commons. He was alarmed that if access to pasture were unregulated, the pasture would be over-exploited through each individual's intention of maximizing his or her own gains by putting more livestock out to graze; consequently, the shared pasture would go into ruin. According to Hardin, any commons with a limited carrying capacity that is always open to all, in which those who pursue rational economic activities utilize them to maximize their own gains, inevitably becomes devastated. The individuals' freedom to pursue their own egocentric interests leads to the tragedy of the commons. To prevent this situation, Hardin argued, "mutual coercion mutually agreed upon" is required in order to constrain each individual's freedom. Thus, the establishment of private property rights or the intervention and expansion of centralized state power over the commons has been proposed as a way to prevent the tragedy of the commons (Hardin 1968, 1994, 1998; Ostrom 2003).This argument regarding "the tragedy of the commons" has been cited widely beyond the boundary of natural science including in ecological anthropology, demography, law, politics, ethics, geography, psychology, sociology, and public administration; the frequency of citation has increased (Burger and Gochfeld 1998). On the one hand, studies supporting Hardin's argument have been carried out by presenting cases about overexploitation of resources, destruction of habitats, and extinction of species resulting from population growth. On the other hand, some studies have criticized this approach, sought cases of successful management of a commons, and tried to find social conditions and mechanisms for it. The work of Elinor Ostrom, "Governing the Commons" opened the possibility of sustainable management of common pool resources (CPRs) through local people's autonomous institutions, rather than through privatization or state control.Is Ostrom's understanding of the commons sufficient and proper? If the design principles Ostrom suggested are maintained, do CPRs remain as they are? What characteristics make CPRs able to be managed sustainably? Is it because of the nature of the resources or due to other causes? If Ostrom's approach is taken, can natural resources be kept healthy as CPRs? While this paper begins with those questions, it seeks to figure out what CPR management is and explores how discussion about CPRs contributes to the reduction of environmental problems and achievement of sustainable conditions. Section 2 describes the achievements of and limits to Ostrom's approach, while comparing Ostrom's understanding of CPRs with previous scholars. Section 3 re-defines the concept of CPRs based on sociological imagination. Section 4 applies the redefined concept of CPRs, with increased focus on social aspects, to real on-going problems with CPRs. Finally, section 5 summarizes and concludes this study.Elinor Ostroms Understanding of CPRsOstrom was awarded the Nobel Prize for her study of CPRs because CPRs are at the center of an essential dispute in economics concerning the role of the market. The concept of CPRs was developed from the concept of public goods, which was conceptualized by Paul A. Samuelson in order to criticize market fundamentalism and libertarianism. Therefore, studies on CPRs incorporated critiques of market fundamentalism and libertarianism from the beginning.1) Discussions related to CPRs before Ostrom's studyBoth natural resources, such as land, water, sunshine, and air, and man-made facilities, including reservoirs and waterways, that are utilized together by a great number of people were traditionally called "commons" These commons have been commodified and privatized through the development of capitalism. …