Dealers and Brokers in Civil Wars: Why States Delegate Rebel Support to Conduit Countries

IF 4.8 1区社会学 Q1 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

International Security Pub Date : 2023-01-01 DOI:10.1162/isec_a_00461

Niklas Karlén, Vladimir Rauta

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引用次数: 1

Abstract

Abstract External state support to non-state armed groups is commonly seen as a direct relationship between a state sponsor and a rebel group. But powerful states often use third-party states as conduits of military aid. These intermediary states are secondary, subordinate principals that are part of extended chains of “dual delegation.” Because intermediaries are likely to have their own separate agendas, powerful states often face a double principal-agent problem when providing material support to rebel groups. The difficulties and problems associated with controlling the agent are reflected in the relationship between the principal and the intermediary. States need to identify the alignment of interests at an early stage, or risk strategic failure. There are two ideal types of intermediaries—dealers and brokers. Case studies of the United States’ support to the Mujahideen in Afghanistan and to UNITA in Angola (channeled through Pakistan and Zaire, respectively) demonstrate that intermediaries affect the provision of external support. States engaging in counterterrorism need to look beyond sponsors of terrorism and explore the role of all states involved in the process of conflict delegation. That states use intermediaries when providing support to non-state armed groups indicates that holding states accountable for violating the nonintervention principle under international law should be reconsidered.

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内战中的交易商和经纪人:为什么国家把叛军支持给导管国家

国家对非国家武装组织的外部支持通常被视为国家赞助者与反叛组织之间的直接关系。但强国经常利用第三方国家作为军事援助的渠道。这些中间状态是次要的、从属的主体，是“双重委托”扩展链的一部分。由于中介机构可能有自己的单独议程，强大的国家在向反叛组织提供物质支持时往往面临双重委托-代理问题。与控制代理人相关的困难和问题反映在委托人和中介之间的关系中。各国需要在早期阶段确定利益的一致性，否则将面临战略失败的风险。有两种理想的中介——交易商和经纪人。对美国对阿富汗圣战者和安哥拉安盟(分别通过巴基斯坦和扎伊尔提供)的支持的个案研究表明，中间人影响了外部支持的提供。从事反恐怖主义的国家需要超越恐怖主义的赞助者，并探索所有参与冲突代表团进程的国家的作用。国家在向非国家武装组织提供支持时使用中间人表明，应重新考虑追究违反国际法不干涉原则的国家的责任。

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来源期刊

International Security Social Sciences-Law

CiteScore

7.40

自引率

10.00%

发文量

期刊介绍： International Security publishes lucid, well-documented essays on the full range of contemporary security issues. Its articles address traditional topics of war and peace, as well as more recent dimensions of security, including environmental, demographic, and humanitarian issues, transnational networks, and emerging technologies. International Security has defined the debate on US national security policy and set the agenda for scholarship on international security affairs for more than forty years. The journal values scholarship that challenges the conventional wisdom, examines policy, engages theory, illuminates history, and discovers new trends. Readers of IS discover new developments in: The causes and prevention of war U.S.-China relations Great power politics Ethnic conflict and intra-state war Terrorism and insurgency Regional security in Africa, Asia, Europe, and Latin America U.S. foreign and defense policy International relations theory Diplomatic and military history Cybersecurity and defense technology Political economy, business, and security Nuclear proliferation.