Autonomous Seller Agent for Multiple Simultaneous English Auctions

P. Anthony, E. Law
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引用次数: 6

Abstract

The growth of online auction is due to the flexibility and convenience that it offers to consumers. In the context of online auction, deriving the best reserve price can be associated to the seller's optimization problem. Determining this reserve price is not straightforward due to the dynamic and unpredictable nature of the auction environment. Setting the price too high will lead to the possibility of no sale outcome. Putting the price too low may produce a sale with less profit due to its lower selling price. The authors propose a strategy to derive the best reserve price based on several selling constraints such as the number of competitors sellers, the number of bidders, the auction duration, and the profit the seller desired when offering an item to be auctioned. However, to obtain the best performance, the strategy must be tuned to the prevailing auction environment where the agent is situated. This paper describes the seller agent's performance under varying auction environments. The purpose of the experimental evaluation is to assess the ability of the agent to identify its environments accurately to enable it to come up with the best reserve price.
自主卖方代理多个同时英语拍卖
网上拍卖的增长是由于它为消费者提供了灵活性和便利性。在网上拍卖的背景下,最佳保留价格的确定与卖方的优化问题有关。由于拍卖环境的动态性和不可预测性,确定这个保留价格并不简单。价格定得太高会导致没有销售结果的可能性。价格过低可能会导致销售利润减少,因为它的售价较低。作者提出了一种基于几个销售约束的策略,如竞争对手卖家的数量、投标人的数量、拍卖持续时间和卖方提供拍卖物品时期望的利润,以获得最佳保留价格。然而,为了获得最佳性能,该策略必须针对代理所处的现行拍卖环境进行调整。本文描述了不同拍卖环境下卖方代理人的行为。实验评估的目的是评估agent准确识别其环境的能力,以使其能够得出最佳保留价格。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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