Evolving Values, Animus, and Same-Sex Marriage

IF 1.5 3区 社会学 Q1 LAW
Daniel O. Conkle
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引用次数: 37

Abstract

Responding to Justice Scalia’s provocative questioning during oral argument in the same-sex marriage cases, I contend in this Essay that a Fourteenth Amendment right to same-sex marriage will emerge, and properly so, when the Supreme Court determines that justice so requires and when that determination is sufficiently supported by evolving national values that, in the words of Professor Alexander Bickel, the Court’s recognition of this right “will — in time, but in a rather immediate foreseeable future — gain general assent.” I suggest that we are fast approaching that juncture, and I go on to analyze three possible groundings for such a ruling: first, substantive due process; second, heightened-scrutiny equal protection; and third, rational-basis equal protection coupled with a finding of illicit “animus.” I contend that each form of constitutional justification can find support in evolving national values. In my judgment, however, the first two alternatives, with primary emphasis on the second, present the best and strongest arguments for a right to same-sex marriage. By contrast, I suggest that it would be misguided, or at least imprudent, for the Court to rely on the third alternative. I argue that the Court’s “animus” reasoning in United States v. Windsor was seriously flawed and that, in any event, this line of reasoning should not be extended to the state-law context.
进化的价值观、敌意和同性婚姻
针对斯卡利亚大法官在同性婚姻案件的口头辩论中提出的具有挑衅意味的问题,我在本文中主张,当最高法院认为正义需要同性婚姻,并且当这一决定得到不断演变的国家价值观的充分支持时,第十四条修正案赋予同性婚姻的权利就会出现,而这种价值观,用亚历山大·比克尔(Alexander Bickel)教授的话来说,就是法院对这一权利的承认“将会——”在不久的将来,但在可预见的将来——获得普遍同意。”我认为我们正在迅速接近这个关键时刻,我接着分析了做出这一裁决的三种可能依据:第一,实质性正当程序;第二,加强审查平等保护;第三,基于理性的平等保护加上非法“敌意”的发现。我认为,每一种形式的宪法辩护都可以在不断发展的国家价值观中找到支持。然而,在我看来,前两种选择,主要强调第二种,为同性婚姻的权利提供了最好和最有力的论据。相比之下,我认为,法院依靠第三种备选办法是错误的,或至少是轻率的。我认为,在美国诉温莎案中,法院的“敌意”推理存在严重缺陷,无论如何,这一推理思路不应扩展到州法语境。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.40
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
期刊介绍: Founded in 1925, the Indiana Law Journal is a general-interest academic legal journal. The Indiana Law Journal is published quarterly by students of the Indiana University Maurer School of Law — Bloomington. The opportunity to become a member of the Journal is available to all students at the end of their first-year. Members are selected in one of two ways. First, students in the top of their class academically are automatically invited to become members. Second, a blind-graded writing competition is held to fill the remaining slots. This competition tests students" Bluebook skills and legal writing ability. Overall, approximately thirty-five offers are extended each year. Candidates who accept their offers make a two-year commitment to the Journal.
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