A cash‐strapped creator's reward‐based crowdfunding strategies with spot sales

Xiaolong Guo, Qian Gao, Tao Li, Yugang Yu
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Abstract

Reward‐based crowdfunding with the all‐or‐nothing mechanism helps cash‐strapped creators raise funds from potential consumers to develop new products. However, this mechanism may hurt the creator in the long run because possible buying frenzies of strategic consumers will cannibalize the demand for spot sales if the project succeeds with overfunding. Through a two‐period model incorporating a crowdfunding period and a spot sales period, we find that strategic consumers' purchasing decisions depend on the probability that they will like the product in spot sales. Moreover, we show that crowdfunding cannot be used to finance when the setup cost that a creator needs to pay for the production is sufficiently high. In addition, for creators who can use crowdfunding to finance, contrary to the intuition that they should not take risks when the market uncertainty is high, we find the opposite results when we take the joint effect of the setup cost and market uncertainty into consideration. To be specific, when the market uncertainty is high and the setup cost is higher than a threshold, the creator can optimally choose the risky strategy. Furthermore, the creator may benefit from market uncertainty when a high setup cost is required to launch the product.
一个现金短缺的创作者基于奖励的众筹策略与现货销售
基于奖励的众筹采用全有或全无的机制,帮助资金紧张的创作者从潜在消费者那里筹集资金来开发新产品。然而,从长远来看,这种机制可能会伤害创造者,因为如果项目获得超额融资,可能出现的战略消费者购买狂潮会蚕食对现货销售的需求。通过一个包含众筹期和现货销售期的两期模型,我们发现战略消费者的购买决策取决于他们在现货销售中喜欢产品的概率。此外,我们还表明,当创造者需要为制作支付的设置成本足够高时,众筹就不能用于融资。此外,对于那些可以利用众筹进行融资的创作者来说,在市场不确定性较大的情况下,他们不应该冒险,而当我们考虑到设置成本和市场不确定性的共同作用时,我们发现了相反的结果。具体地说,当市场不确定性较高且设置成本高于阈值时,创造者可以最优地选择风险策略。此外,当发布产品需要高设置成本时,创建者可能会从市场不确定性中受益。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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