Uniqueness of Equilibrium Payoffs in the Stochastic Model of Bargaining

ERN: Other Microeconomics: General Equilibrium & Disequilibrium Models of Financial Markets (Topic) Pub Date : 2019-11-15 DOI:10.2139/ssrn.3491443

Kirill S. Evdokimov

引用次数: 2

Abstract

Abstract I provide a sufficient condition for the uniqueness of equilibrium payoffs in a model of stochastic bargaining with unanimity rule and risk-averse players. My Condition (S) implies Condition (C) of Merlo and Wilson (1995) and is easy to verify in applications.

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议价随机模型中均衡收益的唯一性

摘要本文给出了具有一致同意规则和风险厌恶参与者的随机议价模型均衡收益的唯一性的充分条件。我的条件(S)隐含Merlo和Wilson(1995)的条件(C)，在应用中易于验证。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

ERN: Other Microeconomics: General Equilibrium & Disequilibrium Models of Financial Markets (Topic)

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