A Kind of Optimal Incentive Strategy for Leader-Follower Games

L. Xiaoping
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Abstract

In this paper, we present a kind of optimal incentive strategy for leader-follower games. Using this strategy, the leader will suffer the least losses in punishing deviation of the follower. We in details discuss a special class of static and dynamic leader-follower games in which the follower's decision is scalar and the cost functions of both leader and follower are quadratic and give the method of determining optimal incentive strategy. The sufficient conditions under which optimal incentive strategy exists are given and the optimal incentive strategies are derived. In order to illustrate the ideas and methods of the paper, a example is given.
一种领导者-追随者博弈的最优激励策略
本文给出了一种最优激励策略。使用这种策略,领导者在惩罚跟随者偏离时损失最小。详细讨论了一类特殊的静态和动态的领导者-追随者博弈,其中追随者的决策是标量的,领导者和追随者的成本函数都是二次的,并给出了确定最优激励策略的方法。给出了最优激励策略存在的充分条件,并导出了最优激励策略。为了说明本文的思想和方法,给出了一个实例。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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