COVID-20: The Comfort Letter Is Dead. Long Live the Comfort Letter?

IF 0.7 Q2 LAW
David Henry, Jacques Buhart
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

On 8 April 2020 the European Commission issued its first comfort letter for a competitor collaboration in the context of its Temporary Framework in response to Covid-19. The issuance of this comfort letter is remarkable, particularly given the paradigm shift from the system of comfort letters before 2003 under Regulation 17 towards a system of self-assessment under Regulation 1/2003. While the EC has since ushered in comprehensive guidance – via block exemptions and guidelines – to assist businesses with the task of self-assessing their compliance with the EU competition rules, such guidance still leaves too much room for error und uncertainty. This is notably the case with respect to non-full function joint ventures, and in particular those that are long-term, complex and high in value. A corollary of this is that, rather than enter into pro-competitive collaboration for fear of antitrust repercussions, companies may prefer to desist. With a view to achieving enhanced legal certainty for such joint ventures, and capitalizing on the good work it is currently doing under the Temporary Framework, the EC may wish, therefore, to give meaningful thought to the introduction of a more generalized system of comfort letters – at least for non-full function joint ventures. COVID-19, Temporary Framework, comfort letter, non-full function joint venture, Regulation 17, legal certainty, Regulation 1/2003, Article 101(3), self-assessment, Informal Guidance Notice
COVID-20:安慰信已死安慰信万岁?
2020年4月8日,欧盟委员会在其应对Covid-19临时框架的背景下,发布了第一份关于竞争对手合作的安慰信。这封安慰信的发布是值得注意的,特别是考虑到2003年之前根据第17号法规的安慰信系统向第1/2003号法规的自我评估系统的范式转变。尽管欧盟委员会此后推出了全面的指导方针——通过集体豁免和指导方针——来帮助企业自我评估其对欧盟竞争规则的遵守情况,但这种指导方针仍然给错误和不确定性留下了太大的空间。对于非全面职能的合资企业,特别是那些长期、复杂和高价值的合资企业,情况尤其如此。由此得出的推论是,企业可能更愿意停止合作,而不是因为担心反垄断的影响而进行有利于竞争的合作。因此,为了增强这种合资企业的法律确定性,并利用它目前在临时框架下所做的良好工作,欧共体可能希望有意义地考虑引入更普遍的安慰信制度-至少对非全功能合资企业。COVID-19,临时框架,安慰信,非全功能合资企业,法规17,法律确定性,法规1/2003,第101(3)条,自我评估,非正式指导通知
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来源期刊
CiteScore
0.90
自引率
25.00%
发文量
18
期刊介绍: Information not localized
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