China-U.S. Institutional Balancing in the Asia-Pacific and Its Implications to China’s Foreign Policy Choices

Abstract

In the context of China’s rapid rise and the U.S.’s hegemonic maintenance, one key challenge of China’s diplomacy is how China deals with its bilateral relations with the U.S. and thus avoids the “Thucydides’s Trap”. Compared with power transition theory, balance of power theory, international institutions theory and social constructivist theory, the China-U.S. institutional balancing theory can better explain the institutionalization of security and analyze the interactions between China and the U.S. in the Asia-Pacific after the Cold War. The China-U.S. institutional balancing suggests that the deepening economic interdependence creates a condition under which China or the U.S. is more likely to conduct a new realist balancing strategy to counter each other and pursue security through international institutions. Under the background of the deepening economic interdependence and the polar distribution of power between China and the U.S., both China and the U.S. conduct institutional balancing in the Asia-Pacific. In the crucial period of China’s peaceful rise, China must avoid repeating past mistakes of the Anglo-German antagonism (1860-1914) and the Soviet Union-U.S. antagonism (1945-1991), and must be cautious to avoid confrontation and conflict with the U.S. The implications of the China-U.S. institutional balancing are as follows: China should continue to carry out institutional balancing to the U.S.; both China and the U.S. should encourage each other to participate in international institutions in the Asia-Pacific region; both China and the U.S. should deepen mutual economic interdependence.