Formal Philosophy and Legal Reasoning: The Validity of Legal Inferences

IF 0.3 3区哲学 Q1 Arts and Humanities

Logique et Analyse Pub Date : 2016-01-01 DOI:10.2143/LEA.234.0.3159742

Clayton Peterson, J. Marquis

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引用次数: 1

Abstract

The aim of the present paper is to introduce a method to test the validity of legal inferences. We begin by presenting the rationale of our method and then we expose the philosophical foundations of our analysis. If formal philosophy is to be of help to legal discourse, then it must first reflect upon the law's fundamental characteristics that should be taken into account. Our analysis shows that (Canadian) legal discourse possesses three fundamental characteristics which ought to be considered if one wants to represent the formal structure of legal arguments. These characteristics are the presupposed consistency of legal discourse, the fact that there is a hierarchy between norms and obligations to preserve this consistency and the fact that legal inferences are subjected to the principle of deontic consequences. We present a formal deontic logic which is built according to these characteristics and provide the completeness results. Finally, we present a semi-formal method (based on the proposed deontic logic) to test the validity of legal inferences. This paper contributes to the literature insofar as it provides a method that covers a portion of the intuitive validity of legal inferences which is not covered by other frameworks.

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形式哲学与法律推理:法律推理的有效性

本文的目的是介绍一种检验法律推论有效性的方法。我们首先介绍我们的方法的基本原理，然后揭示我们分析的哲学基础。如果形式哲学要对法律话语有所帮助，那么它必须首先反思应该考虑到的法律的基本特征。我们的分析表明，(加拿大)法律话语具有三个基本特征，如果一个人想要代表法律论据的正式结构，就应该考虑这些特征。这些特征是法律话语的预设一致性，事实是规范和义务之间存在等级关系，以保持这种一致性，事实是法律推论服从道义后果原则。我们根据这些特征构造了一个形式道义逻辑，并给出了完备性结果。最后，我们提出了一种半形式化的方法(基于所提出的道义逻辑)来测试法律推理的有效性。本文为文献做出了贡献，因为它提供了一种方法，涵盖了其他框架未涵盖的法律推理的直觉有效性的一部分。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Logique et Analyse PHILOSOPHY-

CiteScore

0.60

自引率

0.00%

发文量

期刊介绍： Logique et Analyse is the continuation of Bulletin Intérieur, which was published from 1954 on by the Belgian National Centre for Logical Investigation, and intended originally only as an internal publication of results for its members and collaborators. Since the start of the new series, in 1958, however, the journal has been open to external submissions (and subscriptions). Logique et Analyse itself subscribes to no particular logical or philosophical doctrine, and so is open to articles from all points of view, provided only that they concern the designated subject matter of the journal.