Online Advertising and the Competition for Data: What Abuse are We Looking For?

Abstract

Competition law has to adapt to the challenges of the digital era, not by changing its objectives but by changing its analytical tools. At a time where the Commission contemplates going back to using exploitative abuses under Article 102 (a) TFEU, an enquiry into the use of these quite unexplored abuses for prohibiting excessive data gathering seems necessary. Considering that online advertising is the financial lungs of the zero-price economy in which platforms operate, we will address the competitive problems of third-party data processing from the standpoint of online advertising. Thus, we will analyse the functioning of advertising markets, how they interact with the consumer-facing markets as regards data extraction and what competitive problems may arise out of this interaction. The framework being set, we will give a detailed analysis of the Facebook decision from the German Competition Authority (GCA) by which it sanctioned Facebook for abuse of dominant position for its extensive data collection policy. Considering the successes and pitfalls of this attempt, we will suggest an analytical framework for approaching third-party data gathering under European competition law and Article 102 (a) TFEU in particular, taking into account exclusionary effects on the advertising side of platforms. advertising market, Facebook case, abuse of dominance (exploitative), abuse of dominance (exclusionary), third-party data gathering, unfair trading conditions, GDPR, causal link, theory of harm, DMA