Sovereign Wealth Funds and Corporate Governance: A Minimalist Response to the New Merchantilism

R. Gilson, C. Milhaupt
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引用次数: 85

Abstract

Sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) have increased dramatically in size as a result of increased commodity prices and the increase in the foreign currency reserves of Asian trading countries. SWF assets now roughly equal those in hedge and private equity funds combined. This growth, and the shift of SWF investment strategy toward equities and increasingly high profile investments like capital infusions into U.S. financial institutions following the subprime mortgage problem, have generated calls for domestic and international regulation. The U.S. and other western economies already regulate the foreign acquisition of control of domestic corporations. However, acquisitions of significant but non-controlling positions are not regulated. The danger is that new regulation will compromise the beneficial recycling of trade surpluses accomplished by SWF investments. In this paper, we situate the controversy over SWF investments in the increasing global trend toward direct governmental involvement in corporate activity, a phenomenon we label the New Merchantilism. We explain why increased transparency of SWF investment portfolios and strategy, the most commonly advanced policy recommendation, does not respond to the chief concern that SWF investments have engendered. We offer a regulatory minimalist response to fears that SWFs will make portfolio investments for strategic rather than economic reasons. Under our proposal, voting rights of SWF equity investments in U.S. corporations would be suspended but reinstated on sale. Thus, SWFs would buy and sell fully voting rights, thereby assuring that the incentives to make non-strategic investments would be unaffected, while the capacity to exercise influence for strategic motives would be constrained. The paper concludes by assessing the extent to which even a regulatory minimalist response remains both over and under inclusive; however, the limited imprecision does not undermine the effectiveness of the response.
主权财富基金与公司治理:对新商品主义的极简回应
由于大宗商品价格上涨和亚洲贸易国家外汇储备增加,主权财富基金(SWFs)的规模急剧扩大。目前,主权财富基金的资产规模大致相当于对冲基金和私人股本基金的总和。这种增长,加上主权财富基金的投资策略转向股票,以及在次贷危机后向美国金融机构注资等越来越引人注目的投资,引发了对国内和国际监管的呼声。美国和其他西方经济体已经对外资收购国内公司的控制权进行了监管。然而,对重要但非控制地位的收购不受监管。危险在于,新法规将损害主权财富基金投资所实现的贸易顺差的有益循环。在本文中,我们将主权财富基金投资的争议置于政府直接参与企业活动的日益增长的全球趋势中,我们将这种现象称为新商品主义。我们解释了为什么提高主权财富基金投资组合和策略的透明度,这是最常见的先进政策建议,并没有回应主权财富基金投资所产生的主要担忧。对于主权财富基金将出于战略而非经济原因进行组合投资的担忧,我们提供了一种监管最小化的回应。根据我们的提议,主权财富基金在美国公司股权投资的投票权将被暂停,但可以恢复出售。因此,主权财富基金将买卖完全投票权,从而确保进行非战略投资的动机不受影响,而出于战略动机施加影响的能力将受到限制。最后,本文评估了即使是监管极简主义的回应,在多大程度上也是包容性过高或过低的;然而,有限的不精确并不会影响应对措施的有效性。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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