{"title":"Why We Don't Really Know What Statistical Significance Means: A Major Educational Failure","authors":"J. Armstrong, R. Hubbard","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1154386","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The Neyman-Pearson theory of hypothesis testing, with the Type I error rate, α, as the significance level, is widely regarded as statistical testing orthodoxy. Fisher’s model of significance testing, where the evidential p value denotes the level of significance, nevertheless dominates statistical testing practice. This paradox has occurred because these two incompatible theories of classical statistical testing have been anonymously mixed together, creating the false impression of a single, coherent model of statistical inference. We show that this hybrid approach to testing, with its misleading p","PeriodicalId":80976,"journal":{"name":"Comparative labor law journal : a publication of the U.S. National Branch of the International Society for Labor Law and Social Security [and] the Wharton School, and the Law School of the University of Pennsylvania","volume":"108 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2006-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"29","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Comparative labor law journal : a publication of the U.S. National Branch of the International Society for Labor Law and Social Security [and] the Wharton School, and the Law School of the University of Pennsylvania","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1154386","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 29
Abstract
The Neyman-Pearson theory of hypothesis testing, with the Type I error rate, α, as the significance level, is widely regarded as statistical testing orthodoxy. Fisher’s model of significance testing, where the evidential p value denotes the level of significance, nevertheless dominates statistical testing practice. This paradox has occurred because these two incompatible theories of classical statistical testing have been anonymously mixed together, creating the false impression of a single, coherent model of statistical inference. We show that this hybrid approach to testing, with its misleading p