Illiquidity and its Discontents: Trading Delays and Foreclosures in the Housing Market

Aaron Hedlund
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引用次数: 46

Abstract

The macroeconomic effects of housing illiquidity are analyzed using a novel directed search model of housing with long-term debt and default. Debt overhang emerges when highly leveraged sellers are forced to post high prices that produce long selling delays. These delays increase foreclosures, raise default premia, and curtail credit. Cheaper credit fuels temporarily higher house prices, faster sales, and fewer foreclosures, but the borrowing surge facilitates future debt overhang and default. More stringent foreclosure punishments also expand credit and, therefore, either generate higher foreclosures or more debt overhang. Leverage caps avoid this conundrum but reduce welfare by restricting borrowing.
非流动性及其不满:住房市场中的交易延迟和止赎
本文采用一种新的具有长期债务和违约的住房定向搜索模型,分析了住房流动性不足的宏观经济影响。当高杠杆的卖家被迫开出高价,导致长时间的抛售延迟时,债务积压就会出现。这些延迟增加了丧失抵押品赎回权,提高了违约溢价,并限制了信贷。较低的信贷成本暂时推高了房价,加快了销售,减少了丧失抵押品赎回权的情况,但借贷激增助长了未来的债务积压和违约。更严厉的止赎惩罚也会扩大信贷,因此,要么导致更多的止赎,要么导致更多的债务积压。杠杆上限避免了这个难题,但通过限制借贷减少了福利。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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