How to Make a Patent Market

Mark A. Lemley, N. Myhrvold
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引用次数: 38

Abstract

Imagine a stock market in which buyers and sellers couldn't find out the prices at which anyone else sold a share of stock. If you wanted to buy (or sell) a share of stock, you'd have to guess what it was worth. The result, everyone would agree, would be massively inefficient. Willing buyers and sellers would often miss each other. Patents, however, exist in just such a blind market. Want to know if you're getting a good deal on a patent license, or acquiring rights in a technology? Too bad. Even if that patent or ones like it have been licensed dozens of times before, the terms of those licenses, including the price itself, will almost invariably be confidential. Patent owners who want to put their rights up for sale face the same problem. The result? Willing licensors and licensees can't find each other. Patent auctions often fizzle, because without a thick market - one with an array of buyers and sellers bidding on price - no one can know whether they are getting a steal or being had. When parties do license patents, the prices are (to the extent we can tell) all over the map. And the rest of the world has no idea what those prices are. This in turn means that courts lack adequate benchmarks to determine a ?reasonable royalty? when companies infringe patents. The solution is straightforward: require publication of patent assignment and license terms. Doing so won't magically make the market for patents work like a stock exchange; there will still be significant uncertainty about whether a patent is valid and what it covers. But it will permit the aggregate record of what companies pay for rights to signal what particular patents are worth and how strong they are, just as derivative financial instruments allow markets to evaluate and price other forms of risk. It will help rationalize patent transactions, turning them from secret, one-off negotiations into a real, working market for patents. And by making it clear to courts and the world at large what the normal price is for patent rights, it will make it that much harder for a few unscrupulous patent owners to hold up legitimate innovators, and for established companies to systematically infringe the rights of others.
如何打造专利市场
想象一个股票市场,买卖双方都不知道其他人卖出股票的价格。如果你想买(或卖)一股股票,你必须猜测它的价值。每个人都会同意,其结果将是效率极低。有意愿的买家和卖家往往会想念对方。然而,专利就存在于这样一个盲目的市场中。想知道您是否在专利许可上获得了一笔好交易,或者获得了一项技术的权利?太糟糕了。即使该专利或类似的专利之前已经被授权了几十次,这些授权的条款,包括价格本身,几乎都是保密的。想要出售专利权的专利权人也面临着同样的问题。结果呢?有意愿的许可方和被许可方找不到对方。专利拍卖往往会失败,因为没有一个密集的市场——一个有大量买家和卖家在价格上竞价的市场——没有人能知道自己是抢到了钱还是被别人拥有了。当各方授权专利时,价格(在我们可以判断的范围内)各不相同。而世界上其他国家不知道这些价格是多少。这反过来意味着法院缺乏足够的基准来确定“合理的版税”。当公司侵犯专利时。解决方案很简单:要求公布专利转让和许可条款。这样做不会神奇地让专利市场像股票交易所一样运作;对于一项专利是否有效以及它所涵盖的内容,仍然存在很大的不确定性。但它将允许公司为权利支付的总记录,以表明特定专利的价值和强度,就像衍生金融工具允许市场评估和定价其他形式的风险一样。这将有助于专利交易的合理化,将它们从秘密的、一次性的谈判变成一个真正的、有效的专利市场。通过向法院和全世界明确专利权的正常价格,将使少数无良的专利所有者阻碍合法创新者的行为变得更加困难,也将使老牌公司系统地侵犯他人的权利变得更加困难。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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