Research on the Audit Failure Based on the Perspective of Manager Behavior Game

Weijun Zhai
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Abstract

The ever-changing external economic environment brings new challenges to the audit supervision department to strengthen the management of audit failure. This paper analyzes the relationship between audit failure and the mechanism of stimulation and punishment based on the game theory analysis model of managers' behavior in project management. In order to avoid the audit failure, this paper provides effective analysis tools and suggestions to improve the mechanism of current incentive and punishment in the final.
基于管理者行为博弈视角的审计失败研究
不断变化的外部经济环境对审计监督部门加强审计失效管理提出了新的挑战。本文基于项目管理管理者行为的博弈论分析模型,分析了审计失败与奖惩机制之间的关系。为了避免审计失败,本文最后提出了有效的分析工具和完善现行激励与惩罚机制的建议。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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