Allies and Adversaries: The Roles of Appointees in Administrative Policymaking under Separation of Powers

2区 法学 Q1 Social Sciences
Patrick L. Warren
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引用次数: 2

Abstract

In a system of divided power, public sector agencies are an important front in the day-to-day battle for political supremacy between the executive and the legislature. The executive's key agents in this conflict are his appointees, who are observed playing two broad roles: allies, where they work to help Congress implement policy and adversaries, where they fight with Congress to shift policy strongly in the executive's direction. This paper studies how these two roles arise and what implications they have for the interaction of Congress and the executive in administrative policymaking. Thereby, it highlights how intrinsically motivated bureaucrats combined with hierarchical control affect the ability of the political principals to control the execution of policy. Furthermore, I explore how this interaction shifts under alternative institutional forms, and how it leads appointees to "marry the natives." The model makes several predictions concerning Congressional oversight of bureaucratic agencies. These predictions are broadly supported by an empirical analysis of audit reports released by the Government Accountability Office.
盟友与对手:三权分立下被任命者在行政决策中的角色
在权力分立的体制中,公共部门机构是行政机关和立法机关之间争夺政治霸权的日常斗争的重要前线。在这场冲突中,行政部门的关键代理人是他任命的人,他们被观察到扮演着两大角色:盟友,他们帮助国会实施政策;对手,他们与国会斗争,使政策朝着行政部门的方向强烈转变。本文研究了这两个角色是如何产生的,以及它们对国会和行政部门在行政决策中的相互作用有什么影响。因此,它强调了内在动机与等级控制相结合的官僚如何影响政治主体控制政策执行的能力。此外,我还探讨了这种互动如何在不同的制度形式下发生变化,以及它如何导致被任命者“与当地人结婚”。该模型对国会对官僚机构的监督做出了几项预测。这些预测得到了对美国政府问责局(Government Accountability Office)发布的审计报告的实证分析的广泛支持。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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