God and Moral Skepticism

Abstract

order to make our moral discourse and practice intelligible we must refer to making sense of, or understanding as rational. Morality will be grounded on God if we need to refer to God to make sense of our moral concepts and practices. Here I wish to look at one aspect of our moral practice that may or practice of making knowledge claims in regards to morality; that is, claimshould not do. What I wish to argue for is that it is hard, if not impossible, to make sense of this aspect of our moral practice without supposing theism. preliminary remarks, I will look at a recent skeptical argument found in KierKnowing Right from Wrong. We can call this the argument from epistemic luck, since it tries to show that if our moral beliefs are true, then it is only a 1 I will argue that the theist is in a much better position to respond to the argument from epistemic luck than his atheist counterpart.