Co-opted boards and earnings management: Evidence of reduced short-termist behavior

IF 3.8 4区 管理学 Q2 BUSINESS
Oneil Harris, Asligul Erkan
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引用次数: 7

Abstract

This study contributes to the emerging literature on board co-option by examining how and to what extent co-opted directors influence managers’ attitudes about earnings management. We find robust evidence that co-option mitigates both real activities and accrual-based earnings management. Our findings support the view that higher co-option reduces managerial short-termism because it enhances managers’ job security as co-opted directors are known to be less likely to remove managers from office. Our results are robust to different measures of both co-option and earnings management, and they continue to hold after accounting for endogeneity and selection concerns. Finally, we provide additional evidence showing that a higher degree of co-option lowers the likelihood of the chief executive officer (CEO) being forcefully removed from the office for managing earnings in the previous year. JEL CLASSIFICATION G30; G34; G39
增选董事会与盈余管理:短期行为减少的证据
本研究通过考察增选董事如何以及在多大程度上影响经理对盈余管理的态度,为董事会增选的新兴文献做出了贡献。我们发现强有力的证据表明,共同期权减轻了实际活动和基于权责发生制的盈余管理。我们的研究结果支持这样一种观点,即更高的增选率降低了管理层的短期主义,因为它增强了管理者的工作安全感,因为众所周知,增选董事不太可能罢免管理者。我们的结果对共同期权和盈余管理的不同措施都是稳健的,并且在考虑了内生性和选择问题后,它们继续持有。最后,我们提供了额外的证据,表明更高程度的共同选择降低了首席执行官(CEO)在前一年因管理收益而被强制免职的可能性。凝胶分类g30;G34;G39
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
7.50
自引率
6.90%
发文量
14
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