{"title":"Klassizistisch oder innovativ? Zur Rechtsprechung von Diokletians Reskriptenkanzlei","authors":"Jan Dirk Harke","doi":"10.1515/mill-2020-0006","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Modern research has established the prejudice that Diocletian focused on defending Roman law against the influence of primitive legal concepts of non-Roman origin and aimed to protect classical law from any kind of change. This is based, on the one hand, on circular textual criticism, which declared all innovations in the jurisprudence of Diocletian’s chancellery to be the result of later alterations of the primary texts, and, on the other hand, on the assumption that the parties to a dispute confronted the emperor directly with their own legal ideas, even though they knew that he judged only according to Roman law. An unbiased examination of Diocletian’s decisions on the law of obligations reveals a completely different picture: The rulings by which Diocletian’s chancellery purportedly reacted to popular legal ideas can almost always be explained by misunderstandings which stem from the concepts of classical Roman law itself. And once liberated from the exaggerated textual criticism of the 20th century, one can identify a variety of innovations that are more in keeping with Diocletian’s character than the obstinate conservatism that is commonly attributed to him in legal matters.","PeriodicalId":36600,"journal":{"name":"Millennium DIPr","volume":"23 1","pages":"139 - 162"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2020-11-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Millennium DIPr","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1515/mill-2020-0006","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q4","JCRName":"Social Sciences","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
Abstract Modern research has established the prejudice that Diocletian focused on defending Roman law against the influence of primitive legal concepts of non-Roman origin and aimed to protect classical law from any kind of change. This is based, on the one hand, on circular textual criticism, which declared all innovations in the jurisprudence of Diocletian’s chancellery to be the result of later alterations of the primary texts, and, on the other hand, on the assumption that the parties to a dispute confronted the emperor directly with their own legal ideas, even though they knew that he judged only according to Roman law. An unbiased examination of Diocletian’s decisions on the law of obligations reveals a completely different picture: The rulings by which Diocletian’s chancellery purportedly reacted to popular legal ideas can almost always be explained by misunderstandings which stem from the concepts of classical Roman law itself. And once liberated from the exaggerated textual criticism of the 20th century, one can identify a variety of innovations that are more in keeping with Diocletian’s character than the obstinate conservatism that is commonly attributed to him in legal matters.