From Fair Decision Making To Social Equality

Hussein Mozannar, Mesrob I. Ohannessian, N. Srebro
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引用次数: 86

Abstract

The study of fairness in intelligent decision systems has mostly ignored long-term influence on the underlying population. Yet fairness considerations (e.g. affirmative action) have often the implicit goal of achieving balance among groups within the population. The most basic notion of balance is eventual equality between the qualifications of the groups. How can we incorporate influence dynamics in decision making? How well do dynamics-oblivious fairness policies fare in terms of reaching equality? In this paper, we propose a simple yet revealing model that encompasses (1) a selection process where an institution chooses from multiple groups according to their qualifications so as to maximize an institutional utility and (2) dynamics that govern the evolution of the groups' qualifications according to the imposed policies. We focus on demographic parity as the formalism of affirmative action. We first give conditions under which an unconstrained policy reaches equality on its own. In this case, surprisingly, imposing demographic parity may break equality. When it doesn't, one would expect the additional constraint to reduce utility, however, we show that utility may in fact increase. In real world scenarios, unconstrained policies do not lead to equality. In such cases, we show that although imposing demographic parity may remedy it, there is a danger that groups settle at a worse set of qualifications. As a silver lining, we also identify when the constraint not only leads to equality, but also improves all groups. These cases and trade-offs are instrumental in determining when and how imposing demographic parity can be beneficial in selection processes, both for the institution and for society on the long run.
从公平决策到社会平等
对智能决策系统公平性的研究大多忽略了对潜在人群的长期影响。然而,公平考虑(例如平权行动)往往隐含着实现人口中各群体之间平衡的目标。最基本的平衡概念是各组资格之间的最终平等。我们如何在决策中纳入影响动态?动态无关的公平政策在实现平等方面表现如何?在本文中,我们提出了一个简单但具有启发性的模型,该模型包含(1)一个选择过程,一个机构根据其资格从多个群体中进行选择,以最大化制度效用;(2)根据所施加的政策控制群体资格演变的动态。我们把人口平等作为平权行动的形式主义来关注。我们首先给出不受约束的政策自行达到平等的条件。在这种情况下,令人惊讶的是,强制实行人口平等可能会打破平等。当它不这样做时,人们会期望额外的约束会降低效用,然而,我们表明效用实际上可能会增加。在现实世界中,不受约束的政策不会导致平等。在这种情况下,我们表明,尽管实行人口平等可能会补救它,但存在一种危险,即群体满足于一套更糟糕的资格。作为一线希望,我们也会发现约束不仅会带来平等,还会改善所有群体。从长远来看,这些案例和权衡有助于确定何时以及如何在选择过程中对机构和社会有利。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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