Are Buyout Sponsors Market Timers in RLBOs?

Q4 Economics, Econometrics and Finance
Jerry X. Cao
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引用次数: 4

Abstract

Using a comprehensive sample of RLBOs (reverse leveraged buyouts) from 1981 to 2006, this paper analyzes buyout sponsors’ exit strategies to assess whether their market timing affects the LBO restructuring process. The results indicate that LBO duration is negatively related to hot both IPO market conditions and industry valuation, which suggests that sponsors spend less time restructuring LBOs under more favorable external market conditions. RLBOs with shorter LBO duration experience greater deterioration of performance and the listing of immature LBOs (quick flip) leads to a high probability of bankruptcy. Moreover, post IPO, buyout sponsors tend to exit selectively; that is, they are more likely to exit when industry valuation is higher, and the more reputable sponsors are more likely to do so via facilitating takeovers.
买断发起人是rlbo中的市场计时器吗?
本文以1981年至2006年的反向杠杆收购(rlbo)为样本,分析了收购发起人的退出策略,以评估其市场时机是否影响杠杆收购重组过程。结果表明,杠杆收购持续时间与IPO市场条件和行业估值均呈负相关,表明在外部市场条件较好的情况下,保荐人重组杠杆收购的时间较少。杠杆收购持续时间较短的rlbo业绩恶化更严重,不成熟的LBO上市(快速翻转)导致破产的概率更高。此外,在IPO之后,收购保荐人倾向于选择性退出;也就是说,当行业估值较高时,它们更有可能退出,而声誉较好的保荐人更有可能通过促进收购来退出。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
Journal of Private Equity
Journal of Private Equity BUSINESS, FINANCE-
CiteScore
0.40
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
期刊介绍: The Journal of Private Equity (JPE) gives you in-depth analysis of today"s most innovative strategies and techniques in private equity and venture capital. It shows you the what, how and why of successful deals with detailed explanations, probing analysis, and real-life case studies—and shows you how to immediately apply them to your own deals.
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