Tolerance as Suppressed Disapproval

Abstract

In this text, I am going to deal with the concept of tolerance. This concept plays a central role in the tradition of liberal thinking. But it is used in literature rather loosely, which has the potential to cause misunderstandings. I will work within the semantic framework of expressivism. I’m not saying that this particular metaethical theory is necessary to understand the concept of tolerance. The main thesis of my text is that tolerance is a second-order attitude. To tolerate X means to suppress one’s own disapproval of X. This thesis is metaethically neutral. The reader can accept it no matter what metaethical theory he holds. Even a moral realist, moral error theorist, or moral constructivist can admit that tolerance is suppressed disapproval. However, expressivism is very suitable for my purpose because it analyzes the meanings of moral sentences in terms of practical attitudes. This semantic framework helps me to test my language intuitions about the concept of tolerance.