Present-Bias and the Value of Sophistication

Subash Acharya, David Jimenez Gomez, D. Rachinskii, A. Rivera
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引用次数: 3

Abstract

This paper develops a dynamic wealth management model for risk-averse investors displaying present-bias in the form of hyperbolic discounting. The investor chooses an optimal consumption policy and allocates her funds between a risk-free asset, a traded liquid asset, and a non-traded illiquid asset. We characterize these policies for both sophisticated and naive present-biased investors. There are three results. First, sophisticated investors over-consume more than their naive counterparts if and only if their coefficient of relative risk-aversion is smaller than one. As a result, sophistication is welfare reducing (increasing) when risk-aversion is low (high). Second, increasing asset illiquidity always benefits the sophisticated investor more than the naive investor. Thus, the welfare gap between sophisticated and naive investors is increasing in the proxy for asset illiquidity. Finally, present-biased investors accumulate a larger share of their wealth in the non-traded illiquid asset than in the traded risky stock compared to the neoclassical exponential discounter investor. As a consequence, from the perspective of present-biased investors, the equity premium puzzle (1985) and the private equity puzzle (2002) are two sides of the same coin.
现在的偏见和成熟的价值
本文建立了一个以双曲折现形式表现现在偏差的风险厌恶型投资者的动态财富管理模型。投资者选择一个最优的消费政策,并在无风险资产、可交易的流动性资产和不可交易的非流动性资产之间进行资金配置。我们将这些政策描述为成熟的和幼稚的倾向于现在的投资者。有三个结果。首先,当且仅当老练投资者的相对风险厌恶系数小于1时,他们会比幼稚投资者过度消费。因此,当风险厌恶程度低(高)时,复杂是福利减少(增加)。其次,资产非流动性的增加总是使老练的投资者比幼稚的投资者受益更多。因此,老练投资者和幼稚投资者之间的福利差距正在扩大,这是资产流动性不足的代表。最后,与新古典指数贴现型投资者相比,现在偏好型投资者在非交易的非流动性资产中积累的财富份额大于在交易的高风险股票中积累的财富份额。因此,从当前偏好投资者的角度来看,股票溢价之谜(1985年)和私募股权之谜(2002年)是同一枚硬币的两面。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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