Control Acquisition Attack of Aerospace Systems via False Data Injection

IF 1.3 4区 工程技术 Q2 ENGINEERING, AEROSPACE
Garrett A. Jares, J. Valasek
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

The cyber threat to aerospace systems has been growing rapidly in recent years with several real-world and experimental cyberattacks observed. This growing threat has prompted investigation of cyberattack and defense strategies for manned and unmanned air systems, spacecraft, and other aerospace systems. The work in this paper seeks to further understand these attacks by introducing and developing a novel cyberattack for autonomous aerospace systems. The problem faced by the attacker is posed and discussed analytically using false data injection of state measurements to exploit the vehicle’s onboard controller to take control of the system. It is shown that the attacker can utilize traditional control techniques to exert control over the system and eliminate the control of the victim by intercepting and modifying the vehicle’s measurement data. The attacker is able to accomplish this objective without any prior knowledge of the system’s plant, controller, or reference signal. The attack is demonstrated on the elevator-to-pitch-attitude-angle dynamics of a Cessna T-37 aircraft model. It is shown to be successful in eliminating the victim’s control influence over the system and driving the system to its own target state.
基于虚假数据注入的航空航天系统控制获取攻击
近年来,航空航天系统面临的网络威胁迅速增长,已经观察到一些现实世界和实验性的网络攻击。这种日益增长的威胁促使对有人驾驶和无人驾驶航空系统、航天器和其他航空航天系统的网络攻击和防御战略进行调查。本文的工作旨在通过引入和开发一种针对自主航空航天系统的新型网络攻击来进一步理解这些攻击。提出并分析了攻击者所面临的问题,利用状态测量的虚假数据注入来利用车载控制器来控制系统。研究表明,攻击者可以利用传统的控制技术对系统进行控制,并通过拦截和修改车辆的测量数据来消除受害者的控制。攻击者能够在不事先知道系统设备、控制器或参考信号的情况下实现这一目标。攻击在塞斯纳T-37飞机模型的升降-俯仰-姿态-角度动力学上进行了演示。它成功地消除了受害者对系统的控制影响,并将系统驱动到自己的目标状态。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
3.70
自引率
13.30%
发文量
58
审稿时长
>12 weeks
期刊介绍: This Journal is devoted to the dissemination of original archival research papers describing new theoretical developments, novel applications, and case studies regarding advances in aerospace computing, information, and networks and communication systems that address aerospace-specific issues. Issues related to signal processing, electromagnetics, antenna theory, and the basic networking hardware transmission technologies of a network are not within the scope of this journal. Topics include aerospace systems and software engineering; verification and validation of embedded systems; the field known as ‘big data,’ data analytics, machine learning, and knowledge management for aerospace systems; human-automation interaction and systems health management for aerospace systems. Applications of autonomous systems, systems engineering principles, and safety and mission assurance are of particular interest. The Journal also features Technical Notes that discuss particular technical innovations or applications in the topics described above. Papers are also sought that rigorously review the results of recent research developments. In addition to original research papers and reviews, the journal publishes articles that review books, conferences, social media, and new educational modes applicable to the scope of the Journal.
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