The Constitutional Right Not to Participate in Abortions: Roe, Casey, and the Fourteenth Amendment Rights of Healthcare Providers

IF 1 3区 社会学 Q2 LAW
Mark L. Rienzi
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引用次数: 4

Abstract

The Fourteenth Amendment rights of various parties in the abortion context – the pregnant woman, the fetus, the fetus’ father, the state – have been discussed at length by commentators and the courts. Surprisingly, the Fourteenth Amendment rights of the healthcare provider asked to provide the abortion have not. Roe and Casey establish a pregnant woman’s Fourteenth Amendment right to decide for herself whether to have an abortion. Do those same precedents also protect her doctor’s right to decide whether to participate in abortion procedures? The Court’s substantive due process analysis typically looks for rights that are “deeply rooted” in our history and traditions. Accordingly, this article addresses the historical basis for finding that providers do indeed have a Fourteenth Amendment right to refuse to perform abortions. This historical analysis shows that the right to refuse passes the Court’s stated test for Fourteenth Amendment protection. In fact, the right to refuse actually has better historical support, and better satisfies the Court’s stated tests, than the abortion right itself. Beyond this historical case, a healthcare provider’s right to make this decision also fits squarely within the zone of individual decision-making protected by the Court’s opinions in Casey and Lawrence v. Texas, and protects providers from the types of psychological harm that the Court recognized in Roe and Casey. For these reasons, under Roe and Casey, a healthcare provider has a Fourteenth Amendment right to refuse to participate in abortions.
不参与堕胎的宪法权利:罗伊案、凯西案和医疗服务提供者的第十四修正案权利
第十四修正案在堕胎问题上各方的权利——孕妇、胎儿、胎儿的父亲、国家——已经被评论家和法院详细地讨论过。令人惊讶的是,被要求提供堕胎的医疗保健提供者的第十四修正案权利却没有。罗伊案和凯西案确立了孕妇根据第十四修正案自行决定是否堕胎的权利。同样的先例是否也保护她的医生决定是否参与堕胎程序的权利?最高法院的实质性正当程序分析通常寻找“深深植根于”我们的历史和传统的权利。因此,这条论述了判定提供者确实享有第十四修正案规定的拒绝实施堕胎的权利的历史依据。这一历史分析表明,拒绝的权利通过了法院规定的第十四条修正案保护的检验。事实上,拒绝权实际上比堕胎权本身有更好的历史依据,也更能满足法院规定的检验标准。除了这一历史性案例,医疗服务提供者做出这一决定的权利也完全符合法院在Casey和Lawrence诉德克萨斯州案中所保护的个人决策范围,并保护医疗服务提供者免受法院在Roe和Casey案中所承认的各种心理伤害。基于这些原因,根据罗伊案和凯西案,医疗服务提供者根据第十四修正案有权拒绝参与堕胎。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.20
自引率
11.10%
发文量
0
期刊介绍: In 1925, a group of eager and idealistic students founded the Notre Dame Lawyer. Its name was changed in 1982 to the Notre Dame Law Review, but all generations have remained committed to the original founders’ vision of a law review “synonymous with respect for law, and jealous of any unjust attacks upon it.” Today, the Law Review maintains its tradition of excellence, and its membership includes some of the most able and distinguished judges, professors, and practitioners in the country. Entirely student edited, the Law Review offers its members an invaluable occasion for training in precise analysis of legal problems and in clear and cogent presentation of legal issues.
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