The Useful Uselessness of the Humanities

Abstract

Stanley Fish responds to the question with which he titles his essay, " how Will the humanities Save Us? " by objecting to its implicit assumption. As he puts it, " It is not the business of the humanities to save us. " What, then, do they do? Fish answers: They don't do anything, if by " do " is meant bring about effects in the world. And if they don't bring about effects in the world they cannot be justified except in relation to the pleasure they give to those who enjoy them. his voice here is not cynical, nor does he counsel despair, for he argues that it is precisely this doing-nothing, this inherent uselessness, of the humanities that brings honor to its subject. Justification, after all, confers value on an activity from a perspective outside its performance. An activity that cannot be justified is an activity that refuses to regard itself as instrumental to some larger good. The humanities are their own good. There is nothing more to say, and anything that is said…diminishes the object of its supposed praise. With these remarks Fish comes perilously close to being right. But he's not there yet. This is because he does not quite understand how in " doing " nothing, in failing to be useful or justifiable by reference to some value external to themselves, the humanities are actually useful. Their usefulness is indirect, no doubt minimal, and perhaps even paradoxical, but useful they nonetheless are. Such, at least, is the thesis I will propose. Full disclosure: the view I endorse actually belongs to Aristotle. And so, after briefly sketching a few of Fish's arguments, I will devote the bulk of this short paper to some reflections about his Metaphysics and his Politics. In doing so, I will be forced to employ several Aristotelian notions that time will allow me neither to defend nor even to elaborate. I must, therefore, ask for the reader's willingness to entertain the propo