Defensive Technology Use by Political Activists During the Sudanese Revolution

Alaa Daffalla, Lucy Simko, Tadayoshi Kohno, Alexandru G. Bardas
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引用次数: 20

Abstract

Political activism is a worldwide force in geopolitical change and has, historically, helped lead to greater justice, equality, and stopping human rights abuses. A modern revolution—an extreme form of political activism—pits activists, who rely on technology for critical operational tasks, against a resource-rich government that controls the very telecommunications network they must use to operationalize, putting the technology they use under extreme stress. Our work presents insights about activists’ technological defense strategies from interviews with 13 political activists who were active during the 2018-2019 Sudanese revolution. We find that politics and society are driving factors of security and privacy behavior and app adoption. Moreover, a social media blockade can trigger a series of anti-censorship approaches at scale, while a complete internet blackout can cripple activists’ use of technology. Even though the activists’ technological defenses against the threats of surveillance, arrest and physical device seizure were low tech, they were largely sufficient against their adversary. Through these results, we surface key design principles, but we observe that the generalization of design recommendations often runs into fundamental tensions between the security and usability needs of different user groups. Thus, we provide a set of structured questions in an attempt to turn these tensions into opportunities for technology designers and policy makers.
苏丹革命期间政治活动家使用的防御技术
政治行动主义是地缘政治变革中的一股全球性力量,从历史上看,它有助于实现更大的正义、平等和制止侵犯人权的行为。一场现代革命——一种极端形式的政治激进主义——将依靠技术完成关键操作任务的激进分子与资源丰富的政府对立起来,后者控制着他们必须使用的电信网络,使他们使用的技术处于极端压力之下。我们的工作通过对2018-2019年苏丹革命期间活跃的13名政治活动家的采访,展示了对活动家技术防御策略的见解。我们发现,政治和社会是安全、隐私行为和应用采用的驱动因素。此外,社交媒体封锁可能会引发一系列大规模的反审查措施,而完全封锁互联网可能会削弱活动人士对技术的使用。尽管活动人士对监视、逮捕和物理设备没收威胁的技术防御是低技术含量的,但它们在很大程度上足以对付他们的对手。通过这些结果,我们提出了关键的设计原则,但是我们注意到,设计建议的泛化经常在不同用户组的安全性和可用性需求之间遇到根本的紧张关系。因此,我们提供了一组结构化的问题,试图将这些紧张转化为技术设计师和政策制定者的机会。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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