Coercing Compliance with the ICC: Empirical Assessment and Theoretical Implications

Abstract

This article investigates the circumstances under which the threat of ICC prosecution has proved successful in deterring the commission or escalation of mass atrocities. Through a within-case analysis of the domestic situation of Cote d'Ivoire between 2004 and 2011, I find evidence that successful deterrence is a function of two main causal variables, namely the likelihood of arrest or punishment and the leaders' outlook on retaining power in the short-run. I argue that specific values on these variables combined to determine how the threat of ICC prosecution successfully deescalated violence in Cote d’Ivoire in the fall of 2004. This article challenges a set of assumptions widely employed by legal scholars in theorizing international deterrence, stresses the importance of bringing back the relational character of deterrence and concludes by advocating greater attention to the political conditions surrounding ICC operations.