Genealogy of collective intentionality

Q4 Arts and Humanities
J. Brejdak
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Abstract

The present paper attempts to look at on the genealogy of both shared intentionality and collective intentionality, comparing Michael Tomasello’s concept with Max Scheler’s threedimensional concept of intentionality: ens amans, ens volens, ens cogitans, as affective, conative, and cognitive intentionality. I focus on various forms of affective collective intentionality — Schelerian forms of sympathy — to show collective subjectivity from the whole spectrum of emotional intentionality, presented by Scheler’s example of parents standing over the corpse of a child. Even though Tomasello’s works seem to empirically corroborate Scheler’s intuitions about the emotional genealogy of collective intentionality, they will differ in the horizons within they locate intentionality. In the case of the evolutionary psychology of Tomasello, we can talk about the horizon of cooperation, in the case of Scheler’s Scheler’s phenomenology of acts about the horizon of responsibility or co-responsibility, which gives intentionality its unique character. The similarities of both concepts concern the following pillars: 1) genealogy of intentionality covering the dimension of affective intentionality, conative intentionality, and the level of cognitive intentionality; 2) Imitation or, as Scheler would say, following someone. Because a person is recognized by the author of Formalism as an act, or a bundle of acts, the way to understanding and communication with another person is the maieutic coperformance of their acts — i.e., imitation. The maieutic co-execution of acts of others triggers the constitution process of a person, both on an individual and community level. We can speak, in the case of Tomasello, about the ontho- and sociogenetic function of co-executing acts or imitating; however, in the case of Scheler, we are dealing with the clearly axiological nature of such a constitution of both the individual and collective subjectivity (axiological ego, axiological communio); 3) collaborative engagement as a driving force behind collective intentionality in one case in form of co-responsibility, a nature of a collective person (Scheler); in the other case in form of collaboration developing intentionality to various units of community life (Tomasello).
集体意向性的谱系学
本文试图探讨共同意向性和集体意向性的谱系,并将迈克尔·托马塞洛的意向性概念与马克斯·舍勒的意向性三维概念进行比较:人的意向性、人的意向性、人的意向性、情感意向性、意向性和认知意向性。我专注于情感集体意向性的各种形式——谢勒式的同情形式——从情感意向性的整个光谱中展示集体主体性,以谢勒的父母站在孩子尸体旁的例子为例。尽管托马塞洛的作品似乎在经验上证实了谢勒关于集体意向性的情感谱系的直觉,但它们在定位意向性的视野上有所不同。在托马塞洛的进化心理学中,我们可以讨论合作的视界,在谢勒的行为现象学中关于责任或共同责任的视界,这给意向性赋予了独特的特征。这两个概念的相似性主要体现在以下几个方面:1)意向性谱系包括情感意向性维度、意向性维度和认知意向性层面;2)模仿,或者用舍勒的话说,跟随某人。因为一个人被《形式主义》的作者认为是一个行为,或一系列行为,所以理解和与另一个人交流的方式是对他们的行为的美学表现,即模仿。他人行为的良性共同执行触发了一个人在个体和群体层面上的构成过程。在托马塞洛的案例中,我们可以谈论共同执行行为或模仿的个体和社会遗传功能;然而,在舍勒的例子中,我们所讨论的是个人和集体主体性构成(价值论的自我,价值论的共同体)的明显的价值论性质;3)协作参与作为集体意向性背后的驱动力,在一种情况下以共同责任的形式出现,这是一种集体人的性质(Scheler);在另一种情况下,以合作的形式发展对社区生活的各个单位的意向性(Tomasello)。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
Argument  Biannual Philosophical Journal
Argument Biannual Philosophical Journal Arts and Humanities-Religious Studies
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