Judicial Review (Departmentalism) vs Supremacy: The Connection to a 17th Century Debate and a Dilemma for Today

IF 0.4 Q3 LAW
Boleslaw Z. Kabala
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Abstract

Abstract Proponents of judicial supremacy argue that the interpretation of the Constitution by the Supreme Court is authoritative for the two other branches of government, while advocates of judicial review (or departmentalism) argue that authority to interpret the Constitution resides in each branch. Both sides offer historical examples in which their understanding prevailed. How to resolve this impasse? I argue that Hobbes and Spinoza can inform the debate. To do so, I first unpack the terms: what is the difference between judicial review or departmentalism and judicial supremacy? I then show that a renowned legal scholar, Larry Alexander, specifically invokes Hobbes in defense of judicial supremacy. For Alexander, the Supreme Court functions as a Hobbesian sovereign. Spinoza presents a clear alternative to the Hobbesian solution of avoiding a state of nature by concentrating power in a unitary sovereign, namely, via a strategy of diffusing power throughout society. But Spinoza’s solution is not yet a formal separation of powers. This conception of power can therefore clarify the assumptions made by advocates of both judicial review or departmentalism and judicial supremacy. I close by considering instances in American history when the application of departmentalist logic did not lead to a Hobbesian state of nature. And what are the lessons for today? I suggest that it is perhaps time to consider an analog to the Canadian/Israeli notwithstanding clause. But rather than adopting verbatim their legislative override, which effectively designates the legislative branch to be supreme, we could require two of the three independent and equal branches to decide contended constitutional questions. Such an American notwithstanding clause would respect the design of our federal government.
司法审查(部门主义)与至高无上:与17世纪辩论的联系和今天的困境
司法至上的支持者认为,最高法院对宪法的解释对其他两个政府部门来说是权威的,而司法审查(或部门主义)的倡导者则认为,解释宪法的权力属于每个部门。双方都提供了各自理解占上风的历史例子。如何解决这一僵局?我认为霍布斯和斯宾诺莎可以为辩论提供信息。为此,我首先对这些术语进行了分析:司法审查或部门主义与司法至上之间的区别是什么?然后我展示了一位著名的法律学者,拉里·亚历山大,特别引用霍布斯来为司法至上辩护。对亚历山大来说,最高法院是霍布斯式的君主。斯宾诺莎提出了一个明确的替代方案,霍布斯的解决方案是通过将权力集中在一个单一的君主手中,即通过在整个社会中分散权力的策略,来避免自然状态。但斯宾诺莎的解决方案还不是正式的三权分立。因此,这种权力概念可以澄清司法审查或部门主义和司法至上倡导者所做的假设。最后,我考虑了美国历史上应用部门主义逻辑并没有导致霍布斯自然状态的例子。今天的教训是什么?我建议,也许是时候考虑类似于加拿大/以色列的不顾一切条款了。但是,我们可以要求三个独立而平等的分支机构中的两个来决定有争议的宪法问题,而不是逐字逐句地采用他们的立法推翻,这有效地指定了立法部门的最高地位。这样一种美国人不顾一切的条款将尊重我们联邦政府的设计。
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CiteScore
0.80
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13
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