Constitutional Limits on Surveillance: Associational Freedom in the Age of Data Hoarding

IF 1 3区 社会学 Q2 LAW
D. Desai
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引用次数: 8

Abstract

Protecting associational freedom is a core, independent yet unappreciated part of the Fourth Amendment. New surveillance techniques threaten that freedom. Surveillance is no longer forward looking. Law enforcement can obtain the same, if not more, information about all of us by looking backward. Forward-looking surveillance has limits. Some limits are practical such as the cost to place a person in a car to follow a suspect. There are also procedural limits, such as the requirement that surveillance relate to criminal activity. In addition, surveillance such as wiretapping and using a GPS tracker often requires a warrant. Warrants involve review by a neutral magistrate. The warrant sets limits on what information may be collected, how it is collected, and how it can be used. The surveillance is also time limited and requires continual justification to a judge, or the surveillance will be shut down. With backward-looking surveillance all of these protections are gone. Law enforcement can now use low-cost technology to track us or need only ask a business for the record of where we went, whom we called, what we read, and more. Revelation of the NSA’s vast Prism surveillance project is but the most recent example of law enforcement engaging in this sort of over-reaching surveillance. The FBI has previously deployed similar programs to read mail, obtain lists of books read, demand member lists, and generate watch lists of people to round up in case of national emergency. The efforts vary; the harm is the same. Law enforcement has a perfect picture of our activities and associations regardless of whether they are criminal. With digital records these harms are more acute. Once the data about our activities is gathered, law enforcement may keep that data indefinitely. They have a data hoard. That hoard grows with each new data request. Once created, the hoard can be continually rifled to investigate us but without any oversight. In short, data hoards present new ways to harm associational freedom.Yet, our current understanding of associational freedom is thin. We over-focus on speech and miss the importance of the precursors to speech — the ability to share, explore, accept, and reject ideas and then choose whether to speak. Recent work has shown, however, that the Constitution protects many activities that are not speech, for example petition and assembly, because the activities enable self-governance and foster the potential for speech. That work has looked to the First Amendment. I show that these concerns also appear in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and work to protect us from surveillance regardless of whether the acts are speech or whether they are private. Drawing on Fourth Amendment principles, I show how warrant procedures, especially the idea of return, which would require deletion of data after an investigation, must be in place for backward-looking surveillance. This shift will allow law enforcement to access data, but limit the ability to overreach and threaten associational freedom. In short, when new surveillance techniques threaten associational freedom, they must be subject to proper Constitutional limits. This Article explains why those limits are needed, when they must be in place, and how they operate.
宪法对监控的限制:数据囤积时代的结社自由
保护结社自由是第四修正案的核心,独立但未被重视的部分。新的监控技术威胁到了这种自由。监控不再是前瞻性的。执法部门可以通过回顾过去获得同样的,甚至更多的关于我们所有人的信息。前瞻性监控有其局限性。有些限制是实际的,比如派人上车跟踪嫌疑人的成本。还有程序上的限制,例如监视必须与犯罪活动有关的要求。此外,诸如窃听和使用GPS跟踪器之类的监视通常需要搜查令。搜查令须由中立裁判官审查。该搜查令对可以收集哪些信息、如何收集以及如何使用这些信息进行了限制。监视也是有时间限制的,并且需要不断向法官证明理由,否则监视将被关闭。有了反向监控,所有这些保护都不复存在了。执法部门现在可以使用低成本的技术来追踪我们,或者只需要要求企业提供我们去了哪里、给谁打电话、读了什么等等记录。美国国家安全局(NSA)庞大的“棱镜”(Prism)监控项目被曝光,不过是执法部门参与这种越权监控的最新例子。联邦调查局此前已经部署了类似的程序,以读取邮件,获取阅读书籍列表,要求成员列表,并生成监视名单,以便在国家紧急情况下围追围追。各国的努力各不相同;危害是一样的。执法部门对我们的活动和联系有着完美的了解,无论它们是否犯罪。有了数字记录,这些危害更加严重。一旦我们的活动数据被收集,执法部门可能会无限期地保留这些数据。他们有数据储备。随着每一次新的数据请求,这个数据储备都会增长。一旦被创造出来,这些宝藏就会被不断地搜查来调查我们,但不会受到任何监督。简而言之,数据囤积为损害协会自由提供了新的途径。然而,我们目前对结社自由的理解还很浅薄。我们过度关注语言,却忽略了语言的前体——分享、探索、接受和拒绝思想以及选择是否发言的能力——的重要性。然而,最近的工作表明,宪法保护许多非言论的活动,例如请愿和集会,因为这些活动使自治成为可能,并培养言论的潜力。这项工作一直在关注美国宪法第一修正案。我指出,这些担忧也出现在第四修正案的判例中,并有助于保护我们免受监视,无论这些行为是言论还是私人行为。根据第四修正案的原则,我展示了搜查令程序,特别是要求在调查后删除数据的返回的想法,如何必须到位,以进行回溯式监控。这种转变将允许执法部门访问数据,但限制了过度扩张和威胁协会自由的能力。简而言之,当新的监视技术威胁到结社自由时,它们必须受到适当的宪法限制。本文解释了为什么需要这些限制,何时必须设置这些限制,以及它们是如何运作的。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.20
自引率
11.10%
发文量
0
期刊介绍: In 1925, a group of eager and idealistic students founded the Notre Dame Lawyer. Its name was changed in 1982 to the Notre Dame Law Review, but all generations have remained committed to the original founders’ vision of a law review “synonymous with respect for law, and jealous of any unjust attacks upon it.” Today, the Law Review maintains its tradition of excellence, and its membership includes some of the most able and distinguished judges, professors, and practitioners in the country. Entirely student edited, the Law Review offers its members an invaluable occasion for training in precise analysis of legal problems and in clear and cogent presentation of legal issues.
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