Electricity economics for ex-ante double-sided auction mechanism in restructured power market

Energy Conversion and Economics Pub Date : 2021-07-28 DOI:10.1049/enc2.12037

Aruna Kanagaraj, Kumudini Devi Raguru Pandu

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引用次数: 3

Abstract

Auction mechanism analysis provides favourable economic outcomes for key stakeholders involved in the restructured power market. Real power pricing based on locational marginal pricing has been implemented in the electricity market worldwide. In this study, the optimal power flow is considered to minimise the operating cost of the active power generation in the ex-ante energy market and an augmented optimal power flow in the ex-ante reserve market. The double-sided auction mechanism has better control over the energy and reserve markets, enhancing social welfare in the restructured power markets. Single- and double-sided auction mechanisms are considered to analyse the allocation and pricing economics in the ex-ante day-ahead energy and ex-ante day-ahead reserve markets. Locational marginal pricing is calculated and analysed for both the on-and off-peak demand periods. The proposed auction model was validated using an IEEE 30-bus power system. The benefits of the double-sided auction are assessed from technical and economic perspectives.

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重构电力市场中事前双边拍卖机制的电力经济学

拍卖机制分析为参与电力市场重组的主要利益相关者提供了有利的经济结果。基于区位边际定价的实际电价已经在世界范围内的电力市场得到了广泛的应用。本文考虑事前能源市场中有功发电运行成本最小的最优潮流，以及事前储备市场中增强型最优潮流。双向竞价机制更好地调控了能源和储备市场，增强了重构后电力市场的社会福利。考虑单边和双边拍卖机制，分析了事前日前能源和事前日前储备市场的分配和定价经济学。计算和分析了用电高峰期和非用电高峰期的边际电价。采用IEEE 30总线电力系统验证了所提出的拍卖模型。从技术和经济角度对双边拍卖的好处进行了评估。

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Energy Conversion and Economics

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