Peacemaking in Darfur and the Doha Process

Abstract

This chapter provides a practitioner’s perspective on the negotiations leading to the 2011 Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD) and its aftermath. It explains how international actors constrained peace in Darfur by framing Sudan’s conflicts on a north/south axis; by repeating past mistakes in mediation; and by focusing too much on clashes between government and rebel forces when the main threat to civilians came increasingly from government forces and proxy militias. It argues that international actors often pursued approaches that were at odds with each other and should have put more weight behind democratisation. It shows how the Bashir regime used the DDPD to provide cover for its pursuit of a military solution and manipulated implementation to strengthen its grip in Darfur. It also shows how some lessons from past experience are still valid as a new phase in Sudan’s peace process gets underway.