Was Liberty Really Bad for Russia? (Part II)

Q2 Social Sciences
L. Aron
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引用次数: 3

Abstract

"Like Providence in reverse, the Russian government seeks to arrange for the better not the future, but the past."-Aleksandr HerzenIt is very much in the Russian and, even more so, Soviet political tradition for rulers to deprecate their predecessors. As they ascend the power ladder, the would-be Kremlin occupants must profess complete loyalty to the current leader to succeed. Once in power, the country's new masters bolster their authority by dissociating themselves from previous leaders. Along with Russia's weak political institutions, which undermine the transitions' legitimacy, such repudiations almost inevitably result in the personalization of power, as the new occupants mold the political, social, and economic systems to their liking. Hence, Russian and-and especially-Soviet history have often resembled a succession of distinct personal political regimes-indeed, sometimes different states under the same name.Thus, at first blush, this Kremlin's castigation of the 1992-99 period, which is portrayed as an unmitigated disaster, is not unusual. It is described as a time of gratuitously and maliciously inflicted humiliation, of "a failed state," and, most of all, of "chaos."2 Advanced relentlessly, many Russian commentators (who quickly recovered their Soviet skill of line-toeing), and some leading Western media, editorialists, and pundits, have adopted this line of argument.3 The fact that a booming economy has sprung from the alleged calamities of the preceding years, like Athena who appeared fully armed from Zeus's head, does not trouble the latter.4For all its conformity to national tradition, the "chaos" propaganda campaign has several features that do not fit the usual pattern. First, President Vladimir Putin was-and continues to be-very popular, and does not need to gain additional legitimacy at his predecessor's expense. In the 1990s, moreover, the breadth and intensity of public criticism of the government (in newspapers, on television, and in the parliament) were unprecedented in Russian, let alone Soviet, history. All the many warts and boils, real and imagined, of the Boris Yeltsin regime were exposed and lanced at the time. Indeed, many Russian pollsters believe that much of Putin's popularity is due to his not being the late Yeltsin: very sick, often inebriated, and increasingly unsteady and erratic in public. Thus, harping on the very real failures and hardships of the Yeltsin years can hardly be expected to lower the public's opinion of them more than it already is.A plausible explanation is that the chaos mantra's aim is much higher. As often happens in Russia, the past is invoked to shape the present and the future. In this case, the denunciations of the 1990s may, the Kremlin hopes, help manage the tense transition ahead (or the risks of Putin's decision to rewrite the constitution and run again) and, more importantly, establish the direction that Russia should take in the long run. No one disputes that in the 1990s, Russia was the freest it had ever been, save for the nine months between February and November 1917. Just as undeniable is the ideology of the first postcommunist regime. As a leading Russian political analyst stated, it was based on two "simple ideas": that "personal liberty is the foundation of progress of a modern state" and that "Russia has no other way but to follow the Western model of development."5It is this ideology and this model that the current regime is determined to stamp with the "chaos" cliche. If the freest Russia in history produced nothing but misery and disorder, then liberty is, in principle, bad for it. Ergo, Putin's protoauthoritarian "sovereign democracy" and the "vertical of power," in which the executive controls (or owns outright) other branches of government and key sectors of industry.Such fateful implications make the veracity of the chaos claim worth exploring. Specifically, one needs to ascertain, first, whether economic liberalization and democratization bear the primary responsibility for the chaos, and, second, whether there was anything but chaos in the 1990s. …
自由真的对俄罗斯有害吗?(第二部分)
“就像天意颠倒过来一样,俄罗斯政府寻求更好的安排,而不是未来,而是过去。”——亚历山大·赫泽尼统治者贬低前任是俄罗斯的政治传统,苏联的政治传统更是如此。在权力阶梯上升的过程中,未来的克里姆林宫主人必须对现任领导人完全忠诚,才能成功。一旦掌权,这个国家的新主人就会通过与前任领导人分离来巩固自己的权威。随着俄罗斯脆弱的政治制度削弱了过渡的合法性,这种否定几乎不可避免地导致权力个人化,因为新的占有者按照自己的喜好塑造政治、社会和经济体系。因此,俄罗斯的历史,尤其是苏联的历史,常常类似于一系列截然不同的个人政治政权——事实上,有时不同的国家在同一个名字下。因此,乍一看,克里姆林宫对1992年至1999年期间的谴责——被描绘成一场彻底的灾难——并不罕见。它被描述为一个无端和恶意施加羞辱的时代,一个“失败的国家”,最重要的是,一个“混乱”的时代。许多俄国评论家(他们很快就恢复了苏联时期的墨守成行的技巧),以及一些主要的西方媒体、社论家和权威人士,都毫不留情地采纳了这种观点繁荣的经济是从前几年所谓的灾难中产生的,就像雅典娜从宙斯的头上全副武装出现一样,这一事实并没有困扰后者。尽管“乱”宣传运动符合国家传统,但它有几个特点不符合通常的模式。首先,俄罗斯总统弗拉基米尔•普京(Vladimir Putin)过去和现在都非常受欢迎,他不需要以牺牲前任为代价来获得额外的合法性。此外,在20世纪90年代,公众对政府的批评(在报纸、电视和议会上)的广度和强度在俄罗斯历史上是前所未有的,更不用说苏联历史了。鲍里斯·叶利钦(Boris Yeltsin)政权的许多缺点和脓疮,无论是真实的还是想象的,都在当时被揭露和刺痛。事实上,许多俄罗斯民意调查专家认为普京之所以受欢迎,很大程度上是因为他不像已故的叶利钦:病得很重,经常喝醉,在公众面前越来越不稳定和不稳定。因此,对叶利钦时代的失败和困难喋喋不休,很难期望公众对他们的看法比现在更低。一个合理的解释是,混乱咒语的目标要高得多。正如在俄罗斯经常发生的那样,过去被用来塑造现在和未来。在这种情况下,克里姆林宫希望,上世纪90年代的谴责可能有助于管理未来紧张的过渡(或普京决定改写宪法并再次参选的风险),更重要的是,确定俄罗斯长期应该采取的方向。毫无疑问,除了1917年2月至11月的9个月,20世纪90年代的俄罗斯是有史以来最自由的。同样不可否认的是第一个后共产主义政权的意识形态。正如一位著名的俄罗斯政治分析家所说,它基于两个“简单的想法”:“个人自由是现代国家进步的基础”,以及“俄罗斯除了遵循西方的发展模式别无选择”。正是这种意识形态和模式,使得现政权决意要戳穿“混乱”的陈词滥调。如果说历史上最自由的俄罗斯带来的只是苦难和混乱,那么从原则上讲,自由对它是有害的。因此,普京的原型专制的“主权民主”和“垂直权力”,其中行政控制(或完全拥有)政府的其他分支和工业的关键部门。这种决定性的暗示使得混沌论的真实性值得探索。具体来说,我们需要确定的是:第一,经济自由化和民主化是否对混乱负有主要责任;第二,90年代是否没有混乱。…
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来源期刊
Demokratizatsiya
Demokratizatsiya Social Sciences-Political Science and International Relations
CiteScore
1.40
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
期刊介绍: Occupying a unique niche among literary journals, ANQ is filled with short, incisive research-based articles about the literature of the English-speaking world and the language of literature. Contributors unravel obscure allusions, explain sources and analogues, and supply variant manuscript readings. Also included are Old English word studies, textual emendations, and rare correspondence from neglected archives. The journal is an essential source for professors and students, as well as archivists, bibliographers, biographers, editors, lexicographers, and textual scholars. With subjects from Chaucer and Milton to Fitzgerald and Welty, ANQ delves into the heart of literature.
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