{"title":"The EU, Hungary, and Russian vaccine diplomacy","authors":"A. Betmakaev","doi":"10.17223/19988613/78/13","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Since the Fidesz-KDNP alliance rise to power in April 2010 the relations between Hungary and the institutions of the European Union have been becoming more and more strained. A proponent of illiberal democracy, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has pursued a foreign policy shaped by nationalism, often disregarding Brussels stance and provoking conflict. The institutions have accused Hungary of abandoning the principles of liberal democracy and rejecting the European values and threatened to impose sanctions. Orbán played the Euroscepticism card domestically and with the members of the Visegrád Group that supported Hungary in its opposition to the EU's common policy concerning the migrant crisis of 2015. While some may consider Orbán a populist, his Brussels policy can strengthen Hungary's position in the Union. This paper studies how Budapest and Brussels interacted against the backdrop of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020-2021 and what influence Russia had on that interaction. Hungary, having deviated from the course of Europeanisation in its foreign policy, has become increasingly inclined to position itself as a sovereign state, whose government stands up for its national interest and thereby comes into conflict with Brussels. In 2020, this trend developed into the Hungarian National Security Strategy based on the three foundational tenets: 1) Hungary recognizes the global changes and the emergence of an alternative world order;2) Hungary needs to build relationships with other global actors (Russia and China) besides the European Union that (as well as the West, in general) became a considerably weaker element of the international system;and 3) Hungary's policy is framed in the Berlin-Moscow-Istanbul triangle. To sum up, the de-Europeanization backslide within the Hungarian foreign policy manifests itself in Orban's rhetoric against Brussels, in his idea of the Visegrád Group as a prospective part of the Paris-Berlin axis, and in the reinforcement of the Hungary-Russia relations. The article demonstrates how Budapest leverages Russia's vaccine diplomacy to exert pressure on Brussels when Hungarian interests are at stake. The author dismisses the notion of Hungary as of a Russia's Trojan horse, because such view on the Orban's policy concerning the EU institutions is oversimplified and wants to emphasize that Hungary and Russia pursue different interests. The main finding of this study is that Orbán's EU policy is in itself manipulative, aimed at conforming the European foreign policy to the politician's own views. His eventual success would have a significant impact on the transformation of the EU. (English) [ FROM AUTHOR] Представлено развитие отношений между Венгрией и институтами Европейского Союза в связи с фактором России в период пандемии COVID-19. Рассматриваются особенности венгерской дипломатии по во- просам интеграции в контексте строительства нелиберальной демократии, политики открытости в отношении Востока и сотрудничества с Россией в преодолении последствий коронавирусной пандемии. Делается вывод, что, используя ситуацию кризиса и находясь в конфликте с Брюсселем относительно европейских ценностей, Будапешт пытается изменить правила игры в ЕС в соответствии с своими национальными интересами. (Russian) [ FROM AUTHOR] Copyright of Tomsk State University Journal of History is the property of Tomsk State University and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full . (Copyright applies to all s.)","PeriodicalId":43070,"journal":{"name":"Vestnik Tomskogo Gosudarstvennogo Universiteta Istoriya-Tomsk State University Journal of History","volume":"8 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.1000,"publicationDate":"2022-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Vestnik Tomskogo Gosudarstvennogo Universiteta Istoriya-Tomsk State University Journal of History","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.17223/19988613/78/13","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"HISTORY","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
Since the Fidesz-KDNP alliance rise to power in April 2010 the relations between Hungary and the institutions of the European Union have been becoming more and more strained. A proponent of illiberal democracy, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has pursued a foreign policy shaped by nationalism, often disregarding Brussels stance and provoking conflict. The institutions have accused Hungary of abandoning the principles of liberal democracy and rejecting the European values and threatened to impose sanctions. Orbán played the Euroscepticism card domestically and with the members of the Visegrád Group that supported Hungary in its opposition to the EU's common policy concerning the migrant crisis of 2015. While some may consider Orbán a populist, his Brussels policy can strengthen Hungary's position in the Union. This paper studies how Budapest and Brussels interacted against the backdrop of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020-2021 and what influence Russia had on that interaction. Hungary, having deviated from the course of Europeanisation in its foreign policy, has become increasingly inclined to position itself as a sovereign state, whose government stands up for its national interest and thereby comes into conflict with Brussels. In 2020, this trend developed into the Hungarian National Security Strategy based on the three foundational tenets: 1) Hungary recognizes the global changes and the emergence of an alternative world order;2) Hungary needs to build relationships with other global actors (Russia and China) besides the European Union that (as well as the West, in general) became a considerably weaker element of the international system;and 3) Hungary's policy is framed in the Berlin-Moscow-Istanbul triangle. To sum up, the de-Europeanization backslide within the Hungarian foreign policy manifests itself in Orban's rhetoric against Brussels, in his idea of the Visegrád Group as a prospective part of the Paris-Berlin axis, and in the reinforcement of the Hungary-Russia relations. The article demonstrates how Budapest leverages Russia's vaccine diplomacy to exert pressure on Brussels when Hungarian interests are at stake. The author dismisses the notion of Hungary as of a Russia's Trojan horse, because such view on the Orban's policy concerning the EU institutions is oversimplified and wants to emphasize that Hungary and Russia pursue different interests. The main finding of this study is that Orbán's EU policy is in itself manipulative, aimed at conforming the European foreign policy to the politician's own views. His eventual success would have a significant impact on the transformation of the EU. (English) [ FROM AUTHOR] Представлено развитие отношений между Венгрией и институтами Европейского Союза в связи с фактором России в период пандемии COVID-19. Рассматриваются особенности венгерской дипломатии по во- просам интеграции в контексте строительства нелиберальной демократии, политики открытости в отношении Востока и сотрудничества с Россией в преодолении последствий коронавирусной пандемии. Делается вывод, что, используя ситуацию кризиса и находясь в конфликте с Брюсселем относительно европейских ценностей, Будапешт пытается изменить правила игры в ЕС в соответствии с своими национальными интересами. (Russian) [ FROM AUTHOR] Copyright of Tomsk State University Journal of History is the property of Tomsk State University and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full . (Copyright applies to all s.)